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It has been said that the gap in public administration bet-,»-een
academic and practitioner is too wide and needs to be np.rrowed. As a
practitioner in a large complex organization
—
Kr-v^^ Department—for over
twenty-two years, I have been intrigued with the possibilities of ex-
ploring the utility and application of the theoretical concepts in
organization thought to the realities of a government bureaucracy i:nder-
going a dramatic change process. I'.y current two-year assignment as a
graduate student, completely divorced from the "trees" of my sponsor-
ing agency, has enabled me to observe the "forest" of large organiza-
tions in a broad and detached perspective.
Eodem organization thought seems to stress the problems of
adaptation to change in a turbulent environm.ent and the inherent
difficulties accruing when a large bureaucracy must respond to those
changes. I have taken the opportunity'' in this research to examine the
United States Army coping V7ith the most significant peacetime change
that has occurred in the past three decades—the shift from conscrip-
tion to an all-volunteer force. It is a unique case because the goals,
operational policies, defense strategies, and internal processes remain
basically unchanged. Thus my attention will emphasize primarily the
introduction of a single variable, manpov/er procurement, as a new
boundary transaction in a competitive labor market, and the adaptive
response of the Army to this variable.
ii

rilitary manpower prociirement plannin^r has been of special
interest to me because rr.y last R.ssignment prior to entering The
Anericaii University was in ¥iB.v}r planning in recruitment and retention
for the all-volunteer force, l.'.y prime aca.demic interest thereafter
has been in public personnel man^'gement.
The choice of including open-system concepts in theoretical
explanation requires an inter-disciplinary backdrop to the change
phenomena presentee in this research. It will be noted in the biblio-
graphy that most of the social sciences a.re represented.
Ky purpose in matching an actual case study with scholarly
conjectures is not only to illuminate theoretical concepts purporting
to be applicable to change and uncertainty in complex organizations
but also to either confirm or deny their relevance. By making such
heuristic comparisons, it may be possible to refine certain proposi-
tions that ^rill describe more accurate reflections of a change process.
I have greatly benefited from the conscientious and helpful
guidance of Professors A. Lee Fritschler and Hobert P. Bojoiton from
The American University—both in the classroom and as faculty advisers
—
in this endeavor. And v^ere it not for the knowledgeable and perceptive
insights provided by Stephen Herbits of the Department of Defense, my
opportunities in the discovery of data as well as rationale on the
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Americans are currently witnessing a dramatic change process
in one of the largest and perhaps nost complex bureaucratic organiza-
tion in this country—the United States Army. Vt'ith its members sta-
tioned throiighout the world, it is ^oinprised of approximately 800,000
military'- men and women on active duty plus about 400,000 civilians at
the time of this writing. The adoption of an all-volunteer military
force after three decades of conscription involves a. most fundamental
transition from a "given" input of human resources to an impressive
boundary transaction in which the m.ilitary must actively compete for
sizable numbers of men and women in the labor market. This is a monu-
mental task, unprecedented in any nation's historj'-. At present, the
Administration views a force of 800,000 active Army servicemen as its
minimum peacetime requirement. As will be described later, the change
was clearly stimulated by exogenous variables and not from elements
within the organization.
The Founding Fathers feared conscription by the central gov-
ernment would lead to unnecessary abridgment of personal freedoms.
Until the Civil v.ar there was no draft; the system of compulsorjf ser-
vice instituted in 18^3 was born of necessity and was, in any event,
far short of being comprehensive. In both 191? ^.nd 1940, the draft
1

emerged p.pain as a •'.rartime expedient. In 1948 the Selective service
Sy.sten v.t.s reviv-d to rr.aintc'in preparedness for cold v;?.r crises.
After the Korean .pr, it remained in existence and was once again an
important source of nanpov/er v-hen the nation became deeply involved
in Vietiian in IS^'O- Given the nation's legal and political traditions,
it v.'as yr^itably in..'vit?ble that the idea of a peacetine draft eventually
would be rejected, .'.eanwhilc-, by examining the United States Army as
it proeTr-^saes in tra.ncition, this research explores a case study tha.t
offers intensive analysis of one situation over time and permits a
view in depth of or,^a,nizational dynamics in a bureaucracy.
'i'he dynamic process of a.djustment in the Department of the Army
offers a. convenient case study for the analysis and application of
theoretical princifles on organizational change and adaptation to a
large complex orgpnir.ation. Such pa-st conjectures about change have
been introduced on tlie basis of limited exposure to large American in-
stitutions rather recently by several distinguished scholars of the
social sciences, lost of these writers suggest that their theories
require further testing and refinement under actual conditions in order
to prove their relevance and utility. Tha^t is the challenge and goal of
this research.
The challenge poses a problem in methodology. Kurt Lewin has
often been nuoted -""s saying that there is nothing as practical as a
good theorjf. Perhaj.s one i-eason \vhy social scientists shun results
is that they are not based on "good" theories; i.e., theories that
Kurt Lewin, A IX'-najnic 'i^heor','- of Pcrsonalit},'- : Selected Tapers
(Kew York: KcGrar-ilill Book Company, Inc., 1955^ P- 1^'«

are testable or have "been tester] in realits'. In order for a theoiy to
be testable in reality, it must be composed of a set of interrelated
concepts that purport to mirror the reality being studied. Partially
because of the enormous complexity of the subject matter, there pre
few theories that purport to mirror the world of "organizational be-
havior" to the extent that concrete predictions can be nade. Orgardva-
tions are composed of many parts on multi -levels of analyses. They
must be studied as total systems. Analyzing their parts v.'ithout
taking into account the pattern in vvhich they are imbedded; by which
they are maintained; and for which they exist, may miss a crucial re-
quirement in scientific analysis, namely, that the model used and the
research method derived must mirror the known or assumed empirical
reality of the phenomena studied.
Theorizing about organizational behavior was confined for many
2
years to a stable paradigm: the bureaucratic model—as amended. The
model served both descriptive and prescriptive functions. There is
more recently a second paradigm at work, in terms of a descriptive
?
The German scholar, 1'a.x V/eber, introduced the b\;reaucratic
typologj'- of organization betv/een I905 and 1915 iri hurope. His writ-
ings on bureaucracy have been the subject of considerable attention
and analysis, including critical comment, by such notable authors ps;
Robert K. Kerton, oocial Theory and Social Structure (Clencoe, Illinois!
Free Press, 1957); Alvin \u Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureau-
cracy (Kew York: Free Tress, 1954); Amitai i.tzioni, A Copip.^rative
Ana.lysis of Complex Organizations (Kew York: Free Press, 19^1); Peter
Blau, The I>.'-namics of .'Htireaucracy (Chicago: I'niversity of Chicago
Press, 1955) and Bureaucracy," in Jodem Society (Kew York: Random
House, 195-0; -i^thony J:ov;ns, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little,
Brown and Companj'-, 19*^7); Kichel Crozier, The Bureaucra tic Phenomenon
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19^4); and Gordon Tullock,
The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press,
1965;.

order, that is more comprehensive than the bureaucratic model and one
that will he described later in detail. For the moment, it will suf-
fice to state briefly that the newer paradigm is represented in the
polarized "mechanistic" and "organic" models developed by Burns and
Stalker. These v.-riters see the two models as reflecting different
clusters of patterned events in organizations, 'i'he^'- suggest that the
mechanistic model is found where environmental and technological fac-
tors affecting the organization are stable. The behavior that will
emerge is a fairly good opera tionslization of the bureaucratic model:
functional differentiation, hierarchical authority, and an emphasis
on stable relationships. The organic model calls for fluid adapta-
tions incoirporating special skills, tasks, and techniques as conditions
and circi-uiistances change.
The significance of Bums and Stalker's framework is that the
authors have begun a trend toward the integration of empirically sup-
ported propositions. There is much recent evidence that contem.porary
students of organizational behavior have begun specifying a formidable
array of variables in the analysis of organizations. Anthony Dov/ns,
James Tarch, and Herbert Sim.on have described the relationships among
htmdreds of variables. Organization theorists have also advanced and
tested a large number of empirical propositions. The valxie of these
5Tom Bums and George J^acpherson Stalker, The Iianagement of
Innovation (London: Tavistock iMbli cations, I96IJ. This research
will emphasize some characterizations of the organic model drawn from
a variety of sources and synthesized by the late James D. Thompson.
Salient fea.tures of the mechanistic model are also addressed by
Thompson to the extent he deems necessairy for understanding the
behavior of organizations.

efforts have been in the attempt to build explanatory (and interdis-
ciplinary) bridges within the evolving list of tested propositions.
A relatively recent theorist, James D. Thompson, is best knovm
for his integration of a. wide range of variables including decision
issues, environmental adaptation, and buffer mechanisms, among others,
v.hich reflect his willingness to exploit the ideas of other organiza-
tion typology b\xilders by incorporating their key variables into his
ovn framework. Thompson has uniquely established relationships among
a large number of empirical studies, models, and hj'potheses dravm from
Simon, Dill, Giilick, Urvdck, Selznick, Parsons, Perrow, and others v.-ho
range across the spectrum of organization thought. The works of
Thompson form the theoretical foundation for case-study analysis in
thds research.
To infer that the Army is a large-scale bureaucracy requires
elaboration. The term "bureaucratic organization" calls attention to
the fact that organizations generally possess some sort of adminis-
trative machinery. In an organization that has been formally estab-
lished, a specialized administrative staff usually exists that is
responsible for ma.intaining the orga.nization as a going concern and
for coordinating the activities of its members. Large and complex
organizations reauire an especially elaborate administrative appara-
tus. Oscar Grusky has pointed out that the degree of bureaucratiza-
tion in the military is greater than is generally found in business
enterprise for four reasons: (IJ Nature of its mission, (?^ Size,
(5) Complexity, and {A) Geographical dispersion. The pervasive politi-
cal and social implications involved in the management of destruction

requires stringent controls. The distribution of goods and services
does not rfquire the f^ar.e degree of control. The enomous magnitude
of a centrp.lised mili tar','- establishjicnt nececci tates controls by ex-
tensive r\iles and regijlations. The many component partr. of the mili-
tary mission and the related necessits'- for dispersing military units
all over the "'.orld coi'ihine to emphasize the overall complexity/ of the
American military estp.blishment and to make it highly susceptible to
traditional bureaucratization, ylnderson and Warkov have concluded
from their research that large size alone may not require an unusually
large administrative apparatus, bxit size is_ positively correlated with
organization complexitj'- and, the more complex the system., the greater
5the requirenent for a large adninis trative staff.
By earlier reference to the phrase "boundary transaction" in
connection Tith the all-volunteer force, there is the implication of
system interaction that is supportive of a systems-approach analj'sis
to a govemient agency. TTie phrase further suggests that transactional
x'elationships between systems—the Army and the labor market—requires
Oscar Gruski,'-, ed.. The 3o ci olO|Py of Organizations (New York:
Free Press, 1970J, p. 440. The author's points are a partial reflection
of Weber's t;;,'-pology on bureaucracy in Kssays in Sociology, trans, by
H. K. Gerth and C. Wright J'ills (Kew York: Oxford University Press,
195s).
5
T. ^i. Anderson and Sejonour V.'arkov, "Organizational Size and
Punctional Complexity, " •American Sociological Heviev:, XX'/I (February,
19'^lj» ??-2Q. V-ide variations have been found in the degree of burea.u-
cratiza.tion in organizations, as indicated by the amoimt of effort
devoted to administrative problems, the proportion of administrative
personnel, the hierarchical character of the organization, or the strict
enforcement of administrative procedures and rigid compliance with them.

an "open-system" orientation of research.
Open-System Frainework
The open-system concept is relatively new and there ia a dearth
of writing on its theoretical application to a large governi'^ent t-'arenn-
cracy underg-oing change. It appears that far more scholarly attentioji
n
has been directed toward the resistance to change in hureaucracies .
'
Yet this case study is a reflection of an exogenous mandate for change
that must conspicuously overcome the inertia of past practices.
How can the open-system concept provide a framework for expjji-
ining the processes of change in a government organization? First, it
is necessarj-- to examine its underpinnings. It v/as von Bert?>lanffy
(1950) who first fully disclosed the importance of openness or closed-
ness of the environment as a means of distingidsMng Darv.in's living
organisms from inanimate objects. In contradistinction to physical
objects, any living entit;^'- survives by importing into itself certaiji
types of material from its environment, transfonrjing these in accord-
ance with its own system characteristics, and exporting other types
Traditional or orthodox organizational theories have tended to
view the organiza.tion as a closed system. This tendency has led to 5
disregard of var^'ing orga.nizational environments and the nature of org-
aniz.p.tional dependency on environment. It has led also to an over-
concentration on principles of internal organizational functioning, with
resultant failure to develop and understand such processes ps feedback.
Principal proponents have been LI ton layo, Frederick Taylor, and Luther
Gulick.
7See for examples: Frederick G. Ej''er, and John I'. IVor, Biire.-.u-
rracy and Crea tivit;': (coral Ga.bles, Florida: I!niversit;</- of ?>'iami Press,
19^5); Herbert Kaufman, ''^he Limits of Organizational Change (University,
Alabama: University of Alabama Tress, 1971 JJ Peter jM. Blau, The lynr.rdcs
of TSureaucracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); Victor A.
Thompson, Bureaucracy and Irjiovation (University, Alabama: University of
Alabama Press, 19^^9J > ^'^rid Anthony Lov'ns, Inside B\;reaucracy, 1967-

"back- into the environment. B}/- this procerus, the organism obtains the
additional energy that renders it ' nepentropic'} it becomes capable of
attaining stability in a tine-independent steady-state—a necessar;.'-
condition of adaptability to environmental variance.
In some respects, open-system theor\'- is not a theory at all;
it does not pretend to the spejcific seqn.ences of cause and effect, the
specific hj'potheses and tests of hypotheses which a.re the basic elements
of theory. Open-system thcor"' is rather a frameivork, a meta-theory, a
model in the broadest sense.
William G. Scott writes that modem organization theorj'^: " . . .
is an offspring of the system concept and all it implies.' By its ver;/-
nature as an organization analytically separated from other social sys-
tems, it is vieT/ed as being- exposed to outside influences deriving from
other systems in which it is empirically imbedded. From them there
flows a constant stream of events and influences that shape the con-
ditions under which the members of the system must act.
The environment places demands upon and constrains the organ-
ization in various v.-ays. The total functioning of the organization
cannot be understood, therefore, without explicit and deliberate con-
sideration of these environmental demands and constraints. The mul-
tiple links between the organization and its environment is thought to
o
L. von Bertalanffy, "The Theorj-- of Open Systems in Physics
and Biology," Science, CXI (January 13, 195^)» 29. Nega.tive entropy
(a derivative of "negentropic") states that systems survive and main-
tain their characteristic internal order only so long as they import
from the environment more energy than they expend in the process of
transformation and exportation.
q
Williajn G. Scott, Organization Theor-/-: A }$ehavioral Analysis
For ?%anagement (Honewood, Illinois: l{ichard D. Irwin, Inc., 19i'7j, p. 129<

make it frequently difficult for specifyirig clearly the bour, -^-riep of
any given organization. Ultiriately, a concept of organiz^i '.ion is
"better described by what Edgar Schein calls: "... the stable pro-
cesses of import, conversion, and export, rather than characterintics
such as size, shape, function or structure.
Implicit in all of this is that an organization is an o^jen
system when it takes the external environirient into account; it is
closed v,'hen it does not. The one organization embraces the v.orld; the
other pretends that it does not exist. There is, ho^'cver, some basis
for applying both frameworks, 't.hether an organization is open or close';--
either in its own ej^es or that of the researcher—depends on the relatiA'e
weights given to endogenous and exogenous variables. It is even possi-
ble, as will be shov;n later, to combine the t7/c notiono.
Experience and practice in organizations indicate that tlie en-
vironment does play a major role in what happens within an organization.
Since both input and output are directly related to the environr^ent and
are major components to be included in a.ny analysis, the closed -system
perspective is, almost by definition, inadequate for a comprehensive
understanding of organizations. From an empirical standpoint, too
little of the variance within organizations is explained by intern?.l
factors. But despite all these shortcomings, the perspective persists
Clearly the selection of the military as a case study vith
its trappings of contract, oath, uniform, and living conditions mske
it relatively easy to identify and understand where its organizational
boundaries lie. The delineation would be less certain, hoviever, if one.
examined the so-called "military -Indus trial complex."
" Edg-ar H. Schein, Orga ni z a tions 1 j-'sycholory (Knglewood (Cliffs,
New Jersey: Frentice-llall, Inc., ISC'j), p. 45»
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in the litem tiire and in practice, apparently for the reason that the
cloFed-syntem approach does e:<plain some of what organizations do.
Cr^-anizatioiL? do try to maximize rationality, even if they are aware
that they can attain only "satisficin^r" decisions. They do try to
buffer, level, and smooth out environmental fluctuations. Since
organizational actions are at least partially based on a closed-systen;
perspective, it is a necessarj' component of the organization analyst's
repertoire.
To suifiinarize, the open-system framework is obviously much
broader in its conceptual scope than is the closed-system scheme. This
breadth is iriportant for better understanding and operation of organiza-
tions. At the same time, as Etzioni suggests, the model is much more
"exacting and expensive" when used for research. Pew researchers
have tools or the ability/ to taJce into account all of the various com-
ponents that must be included in even a relatively simple open-system
model. The measurement of the various foims of inputs and consequences
of outputs have not been even moderately developed. For the practitioner,
a full utilization of the model involves the comprehension and evaluation
of the multiple factors that impinge upon his organization.
Coping i.'ith Change and Uncertainty
That a. system is open means not simply that it engages in inter-
changes with the environment but that this interchange is an essential
factor underlying the system's viability, its reproductive ability or
'Amitai Etzioni, fodern Organizations (Lnglewood Cliffs, K'ew
Jersey: Prentice -Hall, Inc., 19'-S4), p. 17.
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continuity, and—the focal point of this study—its ability-- to change.
Despite the comnon occurrence of org-anizational change, its dynamics
and underlying- processes are understood in only rough, ill-defined v/ays.
Because the organization cannot completely control its environment, it
is continually forced to introduce internal changes which allo\? it to
cope more effectively with new challenges presented from outside.
Scholars differ on the meaning of "change." Parsons and Shils
describe the more fundamental elements of societal change. They be-
lieve that a system state at a point in time or at a series of points
in time is a basic referent for the analysis of social systems. It
is also a fundamental referent for the analysis of change from that
state to other states of the system. The consequence of an imperfect
integration is in the nature of the c'se a certain instabilitj', and
therefore susceptible to change if the balance of these forces is al-
tered at some strategic point. Change is a certainty, moreover, for
any society in which the allocations create or maintain dissatisfac-
tion, especially when ciiltural standards and the allocations combine
to intensify need-disposition. Changes in the external situa.tion of
a social system, either in its environmental conditions, changes in its
technology which are not autonomous, and changes in the social situa-
tion of the system, may be cited as the chief exogenous factors in
change
.
Garth Jones describes change simply as: "... a somewhat
"^Talcott Parsom and hdward A. Shils, Toward A General Theors--
of Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954 J, PP« ?31-?32.
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self-ey.plp.natory tern . . . that ruquirnj--' no extenc'-r.d elaboration."
Change relates to movement from oiio state of organj national affairs to
another. This seems a hit ba.ffliiif^ deperriing on ho-.v Jones defines the
v/ord, "movement." nobert Billor t';oes to the- opposite fextreme in
stressing: its elusive qualities by indict. ting that it is an abstrac-
tion imparted to reality rather than an jnhcirent attribute of reality.
Change can only be expressed in 7;el^tional or relative terms rather
than in a.bsolute concepts, v/hen change occ\irs, it ii:iplies that some
state has been altered relative to either a previou,-=' etate of that object
or some other object to which a relationship has been described. Siller
concludes th?-t one must carefully specify the relation-1 referencinf
15
used in the dra,wing of any specific inference. -^ Gordon Lippitt appears
to offer the most sui. table definition foi' this research by stating l/ial:
"Organizational change is any plamied or vr.rlanned altivra-tion of the
status ouo which affects the structure, technoloQ', ;!n^ personnel of
the tota.l organization.''" As one studies the conct-pt of cha-npe, it
becomes clear that it is not directly gjven to us fror- na.ture. It is
an inferred property/. Adjustment from r.ilitarjr conscription to an
Garth N. Jones, Planricd Organir.a tional Chanire: A Stv-d}-- in
Change ]>'-namics (I'ev; York: Frederick A. Praeger, 19''''9j. ?• 5.
15 iobert F. Biller, "Adaptation? 1 Capacity a}id Organizational
Development," Toward p. I'ew Publ i c Adm.ini s tratio n, ed . by I'rank la-rini
^.Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler liiblishing Company, 1971J> P* 1C6.
1^
C-ordon L. Lippitt, ()r/-.an.i.zatio :. 1 :<':newal : rlchieving
Viabilit:.'- in a Chanp i np '.Jorld (liew York: j',rrleton-'Jentury-Crof ts,
19^9j» P» ?"• An acceptance of this definition is not vdthout some
misgiving. Farlier objection to the use of "movement" by Garth Jones
can also be applied to Lippitt' s "status -^uo." If it is agreed that
organisations are constantly changing, then one cannot really identify
a status ouo state, however, the linkage here is vith the p^^.-'istence
of the milita.ry draft over three decades.
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all-volunteer force is lof-ically a prim?ry change element in this
stucly. But, given an unchanging pxirpose, such a system ten^-ls to pre-
sein^e itself within a rer.non^ble ran^e of noma! operating?- conditions
hj'- vhat Geralc3 Caiden describes as:
... maintaining it? interna,! relationships in a steady bal-
ance (arou.nd an equilibrium oscillating between the limits set
by homeostasis) and by adjustin/j to the chan^iing envirorjr'ent
(according to natural laws discovered by cybfri'-netics) revealed
by feedback from multiple external contacts.
The environment changes: piiblic attitudes are constantly
changing, competition increases, technology alters, new needs are
recognized. Political, economic, legal, and deir:ographic conditions
can all be critical for organizations. Culture is not a constant, even
in a single setting. Values and norms change as events occur that
affect the population involved. These changing elements alter the
operations of the organizations, making practices anachronistic that
were once sacred. Adaptations to the environment by organizations are
reflected in many forms. Since organizations are planned social units,
oriented to specific goals under relatively ration?.l leadership, they
are probably more given to change than other social units. Such condi-
tions and their impact on organizations are considered important for
the sake of analysis. Org?,nizations as a special class of open system.s
have properties of their own, but they share other properties in conm.on
with all open systems. These include the importation of energy from the
17Gerald E. Caiden, Admin.istrative '^efo.?!n (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Comran^--, 19^9). p. 46. here Caiden attempts in his lang-
uage to ease the controversy among scholars over "equilibriiun"—
a
steady state—^and "homeostasis"—p.n adjustment process—by resort to
the use of both terns simultaneously.

14
environment, the thro-agh-]>ut or tran.T;.l'orm-? tion of the imported energy
into aome output fonu which ia charact'^ri.T tic o i' the systerr., ihe. ex~
portin^'^ of th;' t oiitp\it into the environ;'-. er.t, ?nd the reene,r(' izin/^ of
the r.yotem fron Gources in the environrient.
The search for key variables p.nr] their evolutionary charpcter-
istic,-; ci'itica.l Lo oi'ganiriational chanAO anil a.iaptacion in an open-system
frane^vork is a rslativelj'- nev focal point of intTirest to scholars
addressing- organizational thou^-rht. ^ichprc Hall recently stated:
'there are practical societal prohi ems that or^. Hni'^ation^O.
a,nalysis can address itself to 7/hile contii-nu n,:, to huilrl
basic knowledge about or^/anizational phenonifej-i-... ^he con-
cern with the natural envirorjinent should furnish analysts
a good opportuui-b/ to stTidy organiKational-envirormiental
transactions.
Any ip.ajoi- organizational ch.-,-n£,e inivolv-.s cor.pl e.-: a[ ;.- oaches, relation-
ships, and processes that have been orly roughly J.d.intified and described
in the literature on change. In conventional e>-peri mental desig-ns, a
single variable (approach, phase or relationshj.]'j is usually r:ariipu-
lated so as to study its effect on other variables. In coinT.lex organi-
zational changes, too many changes often occur too fcst to pennit this
isolation of strategic variables.
One critical point in coping with the envi-roTiT-.ent is the capa-
•'-ci-ty to respond to unstable relations betiveen syi^t-ri and enviroa-nent,
and hence with uncertain-tj'. 'The nature of \mccr L^inty is such that it
is not possible to assign a probability to the oocurronce of nn event.
As will be shown in the case study, the views of i -^/.vrence and Lorsch
18
^.'iichard H. }Iall, Orpani zatiors ---.JtructKr'. and j-ron es-s
(LngleKood Cliffs, J.'ew Jersey: Irentice-hall, Inc., 1972 j, p. 347.

lb
are relevant in that uncertainty,' consir-ts of three component.^ : (ij 'Th'i
lack of clarity of infoima.tioii, {?) 'xhe lonf;-tiine f;j;gn of definitive
/ 19feedback, and (5) The general tincertainty of causal relationships.
But how c^n the orgarazation respond to chanj're and uncertainty/?
If one is permitted to expa.nd the theoretical fraj^.eiTork hy incliiding
political systems theory, then it is Df.vid J^^ston who suggests that
such systems include large repertoires of nechanisms through which the^,'
may seek to cope with their environments. Through these, they regulate
their o'-vn actions, transform their internal network, and may possibly
even reshape their fundamental goa.ls. They may adopt a wide range of
actions of a positive, constnictive, and innovative sort for vrarding
off or absorbing any forces of displacement. They may cope with a dis-
turbance by seeking to change the environment so thfi t the ey.chanf;,es
between the environment are no longer stressful; they may seek to insu-
late themselves against further influences from the environment, or the
members of the system may even transform their ovm relationships funda-
mentally and modifj'- their ovm goals and practices so as to improve their
chances of handling inputs from the environment. Responses are made up
of efforts, limited only by the variety of hiiman skills, resources, and
ingenui t;'/-, to control, modify or basically change either the environment
or the system itself, or both together. A similar fr?mework on adapta-
tion is provided by Lorley Segal who writes:
19
Paul R, L3v;rence and Jay V;. Lorsch, Organization and J',nv:.ron-
ment; 1 anaging Differentiation and Integration (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard L. Irv,-in, 1967J, p. "7-
or)
David r>.ston, A 3^^stem^ Analysis of Political Life (l^ew York:
John V.'iley & Sons, Inc., 1965jf PP« ^C-51, passim .
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To the extent that or^nizations repj^ond to these pressures, they
do f?o hy shiftiriiP; their internal relationships; redesig-ninp their
syston of control, {^ivinf sonie units more independence and discre-
tion and others less, while siirailtanooiisly maintaining the viability
of the organization itself. This procf.-.?s ca.n he considered as one
of balancing organizational differentiation with integration ..."
llichel Crozier is well knovm for his analysis of bureaucratic
behavior but he a.ppears off the- nark in this research by suggesting
that a crisis is needed to precipitate a dram?- tic change in a govern-
ment agency. He goes on to explain that v-ars as T?ell as social and
political crises that \;pset the customary pover eqi^ilibrium provide
excellent opportunities for effecting changes. These provide a dis-
ruption in the essential rhythm prevalent in bureaucracy by the a.lter-
nation of long periods of stability with very short periods of crisis
and change. Br-rro'.ving frnrn the v/ri tings of several distinguished
authors such as Lasswell, Leites, Viilliams, l-'urguson, lilbum, and
Hamblin to support his view, Charles Hermann posits "crisis" along
three dimensions: (ij It threatens high-priority valiies in the organi-
zation, (2) It presents a restricted amount of time in which a response
?1
I'orley Segal, "Organization and ^'nvironment: A Typologj-- of
Adaptability and Structure," (unpublished paper, The American Univer-
sity, I972J, p. 1. ] rofessoi" Segal introduces a.n illuminating t:,''pology
of organizations based on unit linka.ge and relationship of organizations
to their environments. Since his orientation primarily a.ddresses the
influence of clientele support and services, the three-part typology
("chain-structured," "mediatively-structured, " and "adaptively-
structured") is not elaborated here. For excellent case studies in
analysis of the effect of such organization strategies presented in the
j^aston-Segal paragraph above see Ihilip Selznick, TVA and The Gra ss
Roots {y.ew York: Harper ^, Rov, 1949); i^lliott Jacoues, 'I'he Changing
Culture of a Factor"- (Few York: Drj'den Iress, 195^) > and Alvin
Gouldner, )attems of Industrial "Rureaaicracy, 1954*
22
I-'ichel Crozier, The Surea\3cratic Phenomenon, 19^4i PP« 19*^-
?54i pass im. A m.ore likely crisis r/ill occur if the Defense Department
is unable to fulfill its requirement for an all-volunteer force.
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can "be mac^e, and (3j It is unexpected or unanticipated by the organi-
?.ation. ' Yevf would argue that a shift from conscription to an all-volun-
teer force in this case pstudy is other than dranatic; yet, what may
actually be observed is a political mandate for change followed by a
lengthy and deliberate planning cycle reflective of a degree of con-
fidence and optimism—not crises conditions. I'or is bureaucratic
resistance ostensibly pronounced in this case. These observations
support the concliision of Anthony lowns with respect to the relatively
high stren^^th of an externally induced change.' ^
The primar^r interest here rests v>'ith the phenomenon of a changing
input—human resources or manpower procurement. -^ Theoretically, a
sim.plistic correlation of this is noted in terms of what Katz and liahji
describe as one of two "energic" input tj'pes representing new or modi-
fied production imports. This entails a modification of ouantity or
qualitjr in the inflow of materials and messages. These changes may be
due to environment changes, such as the discoverjr of new resources and
the depletion of old ones, or to changes in the transactional process
through which the organizational output provides energic return and
25Charles F. Hermann, "Some Gonsequences of Crisis li'hich Limit
the Viability of Organizations," Administrative Science .^uarterly,
VllI, (June,' I965J, 61-8'^, passim .
Anthonj'- Dovms, Inside Bureaucracy, 19^7> p» 197* Downs
indicates that opportunities for change presented by purely internal
developments are less likely to be utilized than opportunities pre-
sented by external changes, because the latter are visible to external
agents and are therefore more likelj-- to generate pressxire from them.
The term "manpov;er" will be used freouently in this study.
For purposes of brevity and with dubious license, the intention is to
combine both male and female resources within the meaning of the term.
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reinforcement. Changes of inpxit may also come fron the auper-systen
which legitimizes various aspects of organizational functioning- ?.s
when nev/ laws are enacted. A central feature of or/;anizational change
by the Anay as it applies to the all-volunteer force concept points to
a strategy of recruitment and retention (,or socialization^ . The
all-volunteer force ohviously places nev/ concerns an(3 demands on the
Army.
The probltn of mobilj.zing huip.a.n resources concerns a major as-
pect of the external relations of the organization to the situation in
which it operates. Once possessing control of the necessary resources,
then it must have a set of mechanisms by vhich these resources can be
brought to bear on the actual process of goal-implementation in a
changing situation. There are tv'o aspects of thin process. First is
the set of relations to the external situation centering around the
problem of disposal of the product of the organization's activities.
This involves the basis on which the scale of operations is estimated
and on which the settlement of term.s with the recipients of this pro-
duct is arrived at. In the milita.rj'-, for example, the product is con-
sidered to be disposed of immediately to the executive and legislative
branches of the government and through them to the public. The second
aspect of the process is concerned with the inteimal mechanisms on the
mobilisation of resources for sustaining the implementation of the goal.
'Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, The Social l-'sycholOipy of
Organizations (Kew York: John V.'ilej'- l-. Sons, Inc., 19^f")i P« 4^16. The
reader will note that the application is not direct except in terms of
the last tv.'o sentences. However, the framework provided by these auth~




There arises therein a problem of the "claims" of tlie organization to
the resources it needs and hence the settlement of the terns on which
they r:v-.' made avail-^ble to it.
One additional point from Katz and Kahn is {germane. It seems
plausible that a proper theoretical base for effectin^^ adaptation in
a larf-e bureaucracy is through systemic chanf^e rather than the recent
notions of organization development which emphasize change through the
individual. The authors su^^gest that a. major error in dealing vith
problems of organisational change both at the practical and theoretical
level is to ignore the systemic properties of the or/^ajiization and to
conf\ise individual change with modifications in organir.ational var-
iables. The essential weakness is a psychological fa.llacy of concentra-
ting t;pon individijals without regard to t]:Le role relationships that con-
27
stitvite the social system of which they are a part. ''
It is hoped that this research v?ill contribute to the limited
knowledge of organizational change in termis of a new perspective by
examining the realities of a large complex organization confronted with
change a.nd uncertainty. It is offered as a response to the follov/ing
comment of .toitai i.tzioni: "... the study of organizational change
—
as well ?s the study of change in other social iinits—is still a rela-
tively undeveloped field." "
Some studies describe changes in structure, others changes in
goals or pti.rposes, and still others present changes in the rela.tionships'
^"^
Ibid
., pp. 330 and 4 49.
Amitai Ltzioni, A .'jo ciological ^{eader on Complex Organizations
(2d ed.; llew York: -ILnehart and V.inston, Inc., 19*^1>I» ? 585»
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between org-anisations and their social environments. This study poses
a combination of these elements; and a suitable way of intro;nicing such
specification into probleF.s of social change is to examine two separate
aspects of the matter: the circumstancfcR accruln^r and methods employed
to bring about chan^^-e, and the targets at which change is directed.
It has now been noted that social s:i''steF3 v.lthin an open-system
frajnev/ork provide many sources of change. It appears possible to
assess a model of interrelated processes, some of which reinfoi^ce one
another in their present state, others which disrupt one another, and
others which reinforce certain tendencies to change. Such a model
should take account of the pressures, counterpressures, and conflicts
in a social system, in an attempt to locate the soijrces and processes
of change. It may be feasible to predict that -'' certain tj'pe of ch'-^ngG
initiated at a given point, given the salient attributes of the system,
will have specifiable types of consequences at other points. Having
briefly outlined the focus of our attention on the United States Army as
a referent for the application of theoretical principles, the following
key factors vdll be explored: 'iVhat were the antecedent political ele-
ments that precipitated the decision for an all-volunteer force and how
has the Army responded to this change? This paper does not attempt to
judge whether an all-volunteer force is wise—rather, to examine the
process of change.
One author, James D. Thompson, has developed a prepositional
model for coping v/ith uncertainty in a changing environment that seems
to encompass the views of many scholars on strategies of coping v;ith

?9
a changing- environment. Some of bin conjectures will next be ex-
amined in detail as they relate to the chan^jc- process Jiov unrlenvay
in the Army.
29 /Jpmes D. ThoiT.ppon, Orpaniy.ations in Action {utv York:
McGraw-Hill :'3ook Company, 196?) •

CHAPTER II
J!ATCHING A THjiORY V/I'Cll }lxuALITY
James D. Thompson'.s Iroj'oaitiorin
The field of organizations does not have a thc-.or^:, or even ?.
set of theories in the sense of a set of enpirically verified propo-
sitions that are log-ically linked. There are, however, a nuiriher of
perspectives or conceptualizations that are 'becoming' increasingly
crjrstallized and increasingly based upon previous research. 2uch of
the recent literature has attempted to develop some order within the
world of organizational theories.
James B. Thojiipson has developed a set of propositioris {^
"conceptual inventorjr" j that describes hov organizations act (or should
act) given the fact of external constraints on rationality. These pro-
positions are supposed to specify what org-anizations can do, in the face
of threats to rationality, to stay a,s rational as possible. By combining
the works of my theorists, Thompson develops propositions about many areas
of organizational activities. These form a basis for bringing: the in-
sights of the closed- and open-system approaches together. He calls
this notion a newer tradition that enables one to: "... conceive of
complex organizations as open systems, hence indeterminate and faced
with uncertaintj', but at the sair.e time subject to criteria of rationality





orf^anization.3 attempt to be rational, controlling their internal opera-
tions and environment to the greatest extent possible, but never achiev-
ing' a totally closed, rational system. The decree to vrhich the orfard-
zation is successful in achieving rationality is dependent upon the
strength of the internal and external pressures and the organization's
capability of control.
A central problem for comple:x organizations is one of coping
with uncertainty by creating strategies specifically to deal with it.
Chapter 'j.Vo of Thompson's book ( Organizations in Action) contains five
conceptual propositions on org-anizational response to an uncertain
environment. The propositions are regarded as "maneuvering devices"
which provide the organization with some self-control despite inter-
dependence with the envii-uiiirient. Ag h,'i.-5 been no bed in Choptor I, the
Army offers a convenient case study for the application of these pro-
positions to the realities of adaptation to change.
V/hile striving to gmbrace most t;s''pes of organizations, Thompson
admits that his attention is directed to "instrumental" organizations
•which induce or coerce participation. Business enterprise or industrial
activities, vith their conspicuous character of producing an output of
services or physical goods, are most obvious representatives and arc
often used by Thompson in his examples. The Army would seep-, to fit in
the instrumental category although its relationship is less clear and
many theorists are vague on the point. Bla\i and Jcott place the military






"Commonweal Or^^anizations" where the prime benefici?.ry is the public
at large. They arc not suppoaecl to be oriented to the interests of
their "clients." Uncier external democratic control, the public cou.ld
be considered as their o\vners.- The piirpose of the Diilitary is iden-
tical vdth that of the state v,-hich uses its army for the attaimrient of
its objective. A distinctive feature is its intermit bant character of
active emplojTnent. Unlike an industrial unit, the external objectives
of the military are never continuous. Ariaies are only used when state
policy demands. At other tines their objective is wholly internal—
the development of a disciplined efficienc-y or readiness that vill make
them potent for state purposes when they are called upon to fight.
The focal chapter of Thompson's book is entitled, "Rationality
in OrgarJ.zations." The author's conception of organizational ration-
alit;!,'- encompasses at least three activities which the reader vill racog-
nize has been borrowed from the models of numerous authors, some of
which Thompson identifies and others which a.re notably overlooked. The
three components indica.ted are: (l) Input activities, (2) Technological







Il^PUT- >- "COiH: Ti;.Clii;OLUGY" -> OUTIDT 5-
The dotted line is incorporated to reflect the influence of output and
environment as possessing "cybernetic" stimvili on subseouent organiza-
tional activities—an influence, although not depicted below because
5yeter K. Blau and "a. Richard Scott, Fomal Urpanization-s ; A




of its redundancy, that is inherent in the open-system models. The
organization, of course, may also influence (even chan^ej the environ-
ment.
It is interesting: to note that the ahove model is a direct
derivative of earlier theories by David J-aston (l965j» Katz and l>.hn
(I966J, and A. K. jiice (1965J although Thompson does not cite any of
these sources in his writing. The similari-tles are striking, ha.ston
sta-tes that "inputs" provide v/hat may he called the raw materials on
which the system acts so as to produce something called "outputs."
This is described as a massive "conversion" process. Thus his model
is represented as:
IKFUT- .^ GOirvTi- '-^SIOW P<iO0^J.3 OUTPUT







Rice's open-system m.odel closely identifies with the above three plus
the novel addition of "waste material" as part of what he describes as
Easton, A S^is terns Ana.lysis of Political Life, p. 31» Pas ton's
orientation is on the political process.
i;
^YaXz and Kahn, The .Social ]'sycholO|rn/ of Organizations, p. 28.
The authors add a iiseful term for this case-oriented resea.rch vdth res-
spect to the open system—"eciui finality"—which the}/ interpret to mean
that there are more vays than one of producing a given outcome, i.e.,
there does not ha.ve to be a single method for achieving an objective
(pp. ?.6~?'J), The input-transformation cycle of fatz and Kahn is also
presented by Garth Jones in 3 larmed Organizatioivtl Change, (,p. /^),
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an "ey.jiort process," i.e.
IfJOfi' ->- 'jowEiSiu:;
WASTE MATERIAL
Before presenting- 'nioi^pson's propor.itions, it is necessarj'- to
7
amplify his special terms as they will rt-late to our case study. It
will hecone a.pparent that this is a difficult and oninous task because
of the intuitive feeling that some of the terms are unnecessarily vagne
and ahstra.ct. The five main elements are:
Orpanisa.tional Ra.tionality ; Because organizations are expected i.o pro-
duce results, their actions are expected to "be reasonable or rational.
The concepts of rationality/- brought to bear on orfaniza.tions establish
limits n'ithin which organizational action must take place. This in-
volves acquiring the inputs v;hich are taken for granted by the technolog;'/,
and which are then converted to output \inits. Inpvit activities are
interdependent with environmental elements and therefore dema.nd the
logic of an open system. Since these components are interdependent,
organizational rationality requires that they be appropriately geared to
one another. Organizational rationality is some result of: (l) Con-
straints vrhich the organization must face, a.nd (2j Contingencies v;hich
the organization must face. Robert Kerton interprets the rationality
of human action as a process in which persons alv/ays use the objectively
'A. K. nice. The Enterprise and the Knvironrr^ent (London:
Tavistock lublications, I963), pp. I8-I9.
7The definitions, v,-here actually explained by Thompson, are
quoted nearly verbatim. The interpretations that follow the author's
descriptions are those from other sourccr? including the researcher.
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moat adequate means for the attairjnent of their end. '' Although Thompson
repeatedly uses the expression, "norms of rationality," he does not
specify its meaning. One may assume, consistent with lierton's state-
ment, a conventional definition of a rational standard of pattern or
process Tvithin a {^roup. Such usag-e in the propositions relative to com-
plex orga.nization.s that follow is unnecessary hece.vise it is considered
that such instrumental groupings are striving to be rational.
Core Technolojpy : Thompson does not offer a direct definition and admits
that it is an abstraction and an incomplete representation of v/hat the
organisation must do to accomplish desired results. From an earlier
writing in collaboi-ation with Frederick L. Bates, Thompson describes
"technologies" as: "... those sets of man-machine activities which
together produce a desired good or service; in other vords, a system
9
of techniques." For more explicit insight, E. Wight Bakke v^rites:
"Gore technology can be equated with activity processes—essential to
the acQXiisition, maintenance and utilization of the basic resources for
the performance of the organization's function." Finally, hric Trist
and his colleagues allude to this notion by their description of a
Robert K. Kerton, "The Unanticipated Conseouences of Purposive
Social Action," American Sociological Review, I, (December, 193^j» 896.
9James L. Thompson and Fi'ederick L. Bates, "Technology, Organi-
zation, " Administrative Science Quarterly, II (Decepiber, 1957 jj ?25.
The definition is slightly at odds with a description provided by John
T. Zadrozny in rictionar','- of Social Science (1st ed., 1959J- "'CTie body
of knowledge and techniques which pertain to the production of goods."
E, Wight Ba,kke, "Concept of the Social Organization," J odern
Organi ration '''heor},", ed. by I'ason Haire (Kew York: John Vdley &. Sons,
Inc., 1959j» p« "?. This is s. close alignment with Thompson's notion
but Jjakke's name does not appear in his bibliography.
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socio-technical system. They suggest that ?.ny productive; or^ranization
or part thereof is a combination of technology (task re'^xiireraents,
physical layout, equipnent available) and a social systen (a system of
relationships among those v.-ho must perform the jolj).;. For purposes of
application in the case study, it is sviggested that "core technology/"
is analogous to a "conversion process" represented by a ccnplex array
of man-machine systems, some of which are labor-intensive (.e.g. the
combat infantrj,TnanJ and others are capital-intensive (e.g. an air de-
fense system).
Input : Resources required to sTistain or enlarge the core technology'.
David. jCaston provides a siii table link between input and core technology
by describing the former raw matei"ial on which the systen acts so as to
produce something called "output." The way in which this is done is
12
described a.s a- massive "conversion process." 'i'his research will focur
on the human element as an input resoiirce.
Output ; I'o definition is provided. In the absence of Thompson's
comment, a relational definition to the case study will be applied.
Output is represented by a conversion process in a state of readiness
that is capable of defending the United States or otherwise conducting
operations as directed by the President. In wa.rtime, the mode of readi-
ness changes in large part to combat. I!orris Janovdtz regards the
militarj' as a "constabulary force" when it is continuously prepared to
act, committed to the minimum use of force, and se^r ire; viable
Lric 'I'rist, G. Higgin, and A. Pollock, Organizational Choice
(London: Tavistock Riblications, 19^5 )i P« 6.
12
Kaston, A S^.'-stems .Analysis of Political Life, p. 31 •
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interna, tional rcla.tiono, rather than victorj'-, heca.u.'se it h?s incor-
porated a "T)rotective military posture" doctrine, '
Bu ffer ; Ko clei^inition iv<^ provided altho-U£^h Thoji^ppon uses the v,'ord
repeatedly and replete with accompanying- examples taken from the busi-
ner.s and industrial coror^.unities. Sociologist, '^.'alter Buckley, describes
"buffer" as a rjean,s of delaying thG effects of a variable until some
later point in a process. ' This study will reflect a conventional
definition t?iat suggests a "cushioidnf " effect against shock or sharp
impact. It appears analogoiis to Tho:'ipson's usage of the "smoothing-
out" or "leveling" processes.
The above definitions have now been varioiisly elaborated, modi-
fied, and reoriented to reflect properties of the case study. Five
propositions from Thom.psnn yill non- be presented v/ith brief introductory:
corj;ient on their anticipated relevance to the Army. At the conclusion
of each prepositional explana.tion, the conjecture v:ill be restated as
a "scenario" in terms of its probable application to the ca.se study and
reflecting the revised definitional constrvacts. 3 reposition numbers
correspond with those st?ted in Thompson's Chapter Tv?o of Org?. ni z a ti o r^s
in -Action.
Korris Janowitz, "Volunteer Armed Forces and I'ilitary Purpose,"
ForeigTi Affairs, L (April, 1912), AA^. F.uch of the activit;>,'- of peace-
time m.ilita.rj'- organizations is predicated on rather remote contingen-
cies—remote both in terms of time and probability of occurrence.
Although geared for making war, m.ilitary organizations are manned and
maintained over long periods of peace. Yet they miist strive for a high
state of readiness and a capacitj'- to make a quick transition from peace-
time a.ctivit:^,'- to combat.
n'alter Puckley, .:Jociolop7'^ and L.odern oVstems Theory/ (iingle-
wood Cliffs, ]k-v! Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 67.
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2 . 1 miDER N0PJ.:3 OF RATIOI^ALIIT, ORG^JaZATIOKS oh^.K TO 3K AI. OFF TIiVIR
coki% tegidjologi£3 frok K;m}<OTS»:j-:H.:AL iKFLUErcris .
The Arr'ied Forces cequire a aypten v/hi:;^'. yrovidos rpanpovf-er sdeoxiate ir.
nunil^ers and in oualiiT;'' to reet the force levelt.- av. v}iorized T:y civilian
political authority. Conscription has bc-<-,n vie'-/ed by Jairies Gerhardt
as a significant means of relieving bud^cc'tar;',^ ccr.ptra.ints for the or-
ganization of military manpower. It is also a.r; aivl in overcoming some
othe;r restraints on militai^/ effectiveness, i.e.: "... it helps
strenf;then those elements of reserve forces un^^-r direct federal con-
trol; more iniportant, it provides a iriechanisin for rapid p>:p-nsion of
15
active forces in emergencies." Fror 19'''0 throvph 197?> T.he Army has
been enpov.'ered to treat man};o\ver resources (inpc't.-, ,) as a "j-iven" by
virtue of draft legislation permitting a y.andator:," Tnonthly cuot^. system
that avitomatically provided pe.rsonnel through-put to p.atch na,npoi?er
needs in the so-called "core techno] oj
y
.'"
' Relative to the events
that are to follo"', this condition is Aaered as an " eqiiilibriv.Ti state."
15James '.. Gerhardt, The liraf t a nd Jnibli .: ro licy. lgsr:es in
Mli tary fanpo'^ver Frocurenent 1943~19/^ (Colunrnxs: Ohio ;>tate Univer-
sity'- Iress, 1971J> p. 36.
Substitutes for the draft that rould have accomplished nearly
the sPJ^e purpose have been proposed over the years. One is the more
pervasive "Compulsory National Service" v;hich has also been identified
as "Universal Conscription." The other is "Universal Kilitar;^'- 'i'rairdng."
In addressing these two possibilities, the Gates Conmission concluded
that the first alternative would be prohibitively expensive because it
?;ould mean employing almost 6,000,000 young people continuously at a
cost betv.'een .5I6 ^llion and ^''40 Sillion. In effect, it amounts to
forced labor. Additionally, glaring inerr.ities on desirable versus
undesirable assigjxmenta would be prevalent. The second alternative
generally sxiggests the same disadvantages and v-'ould impose more un-
trained personnel on the militar^j'' than could be productively employed.
The Vresident's Commission on an All-Volunteer A^-nied Forc e (Gates
Commission), (Neiv York: F.acnillan Company, 1970/, r)p. If 9-171.
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It is an if'eal stp.te from which to develop a sequence of adaptive '
action.? that are stimulated by change,
SCENARIO A ; THE ARl'T WAS AEP: TO EKSURl'J TiW. irfNAJIC C0!:TI lAH TY OF ITS
COI?Vi^;RSION PH0Gr;3S BY RL30RT TO A GOI-TULSORY EPuAb'T.
?
.
4 UNDKR KOH}';S OF RATIONALITY. 0RGAKIZATI 0??3 SEEK TO AimCIFATK
AITO A1)APT TO L'IjVIROMvIEKTAL C'K7J.'GES .',mCH GAin.'OT Br. BUFFERLD OR
LEVELED.
The military alone has no manpower shortage, even in time of peace.
The time has cone when the militarj' must make 'the transition from
primacy to competition amonp eouals' in the allocation of the na-
tion's manpower and other resources.
Adam Yarmolinsky, 1971
The change to an all-volunteer force has a political b?se because it
was advanced as an Administration goal and because it is in the nor<Tial
peacetime tradition. It will he shown that, in anticipation of declin-
ing popular support for militarj,'- conscription by the 19^0s, the Army
began deliberate planning for establishing alternative means of main-
taining a high level of manpower resources primarily in terms of recruit-
ment stimula.tion. The conventional market approach for a particular
emplojrer or industry has been to rely on wage policjr as an a.djustrnent
mechanism. This presupposes a relatively high elasticity of labor sup-
ply for the specific firm or industry. In retrospect, a comprehensive
voluntary'- recruitment plan must encompass the whole range of living- and
working conditions which shape the image of militarj-- service. The
importance of such occupational valines as intrinsic job interest and
status considerations are factors in career choice among youth. Some
17
Adam ">'armolinflky. The lili tar"- j.stablishment; Its Inppcts
on American Jociet^'- (New York: Karper L Row for the Tv.'entieth Century
l\ind, 1971;, p. 415.
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condition.-^ of militarjr service are nort anenable to ."anagener.t control,
incluoin^^ policif.ti to s.ssnre more effective utilization of individual
skills and abilities, opportunities for upv.ard mobility fror. enlisted to
officer ranks, improved housin/f and fardly living concitions at r.ilitar.'
bases, and increased measxires designed to enhance the status of both
enlisted and officer personnel in the Am;cri Services. The first phase
of organizational adaptation is identified as a "change pla-rining'' state.
SCKNAitIO B ; BY AT.'TI CIFATING WAlvING POFULAH SITPORT ¥02 THi-: T/UY'?, TKK
ARJ/Y A3XIFTKD A PLAJg.'IKG STftATj.GY FOR g]lA?:GK THAT V:OULI)
ASSURL A COKTlIfUOUS VOLUUTAlTf IhTUT 'JO l':3 GOh-Vi-l::iON
PH0CK33.
2 . 2 UNDER NORi:S OF RATIONALI'fY, OHGAiaZATlOiN'S SLKK 'JO BUITKH t.irv^HGN-
KMTAL INTLUfJiGES BY SURlOlTrFiING 'iYj^I'-I TLGHI>1CAL GOlltS Vl'i'H IhTUT
AliJ) OUTPUT CO:.JOi:i'.KTS .
As a planning function, the previous proposition is a transient process
which is, of course, subject to nodification at later stagres. Froposi-
tion 2.2 is the initial implementation. 'The Army not only has been able
to obtain increased personnel compensation and to implement innovative
progrpjns (e.g.s education and travel^ as inducementr, but has also re-
vamped their recruiting organization by placing additional recruiting
offices near strategic geographical locations, by enlarged staffing of
each office, and by allocating greater resources to publicity' ^nd. image-
biiilding on railitaiy careers. Although attention for the moment to
output concerns is evaded here, this scenario is identified a.s "prir.arj'
adaptational phenomena."
SCEKARIO C: THE AR?.T HAS REALLOGATED AND IfPOiTKD Hj.SOURGES, I. ODIFIED
ITS STRUCTUR3-J AND ENGAGi:>D IN A FROFAG.UCDISTIG CAJ-F-UGN iXlR






5 UNDl^g r,OmS OF lUTIONALIlT. ORGAinZATICKS SEEK TO S?:OOTH OUT Il.TUT
AITD OUTPUT TRAJ?SA(;TIG?:3 .
'Hhe shortfalls in rmrobers and ru^lity of nanpower inputs have prompted
the search for altf?rnp tives that rill assure the maintenance of a £7iven
18
mimber of ri?.npower resources. Heducing r.anpover requirements is an
obviouf! alternative but not v/ithin the purview of this paper since the
size of t\c: core technology has been assur.ed as stable and the present
level of 800,000 is the currently approved fi^nire. Recndting fer^ales,
older a,^;e ^-roups, forr;er servicenen, and beirig less selective in irental
and phypicpl standards have been posed as possible options in order to
maintain a continuing: inflov,-. A more sophisticated alternative, and one
that has actually been pursued in the milit^.r}' for r^.any years, is an
emphasj'^ on retention, or socialization. By increasinf retention, a
relatively pta.blfe nilitaiy force is auhievcci with t:it- requirement of
personnel inputs to rierely natch the egress of retirees. Career devel-
opment including eniication, promotion, seniority' step wage increases,
greater rcriponsildlities, professionalise, and large retirement benefits
are socialir:ation elf^nents in support of a career service, h'.en v/ith
critical rkills, such as doctors, are being provided added monetary in-
centives to join and remain in the Service. All of these elements
1 a
Harold ^'.ool'n analysis of recent recruitment and retention
cxpei'ir-,noe provided no clear evidence that the supply of militar^^ nan-
power in the short term is in fact highly responsive to differential
pay trends. The evidence indicated that concurrent changes in condi-
tions of militarn'^ service or other non-militarj' supply factors have
overshado-^ed the impact of cha.nging military'-civilian pay rela.tion-
ships \jpon reciiruitment and retention. As a result, any policy gea.red
to meeting recruitment needs through increa,sed pay alone vrould be
uncertain in its effects. Harold \,'ool. The ? ilitaars'- Specialist :




serve as "buffers" to protect the core techriology but these buffers
have not been completely successful. 'ATiile still bein^; primarily
attentive to input transactions, the scope is now enlarged to ?n out-
put aspect in terma of the e^resr, of useful nanpower resources frorr. the
organizration. Scenario D, therefore, is identified as "alternative
adaptational strategies."
SCEKAMO I) ; THE ARIT SOUGHT TO BUFFKR IIIFU? ?3lAJ;3AC'riOr3 THHOUG:-'! (ij
LESS STRIKGLIn^T Sr,Ll-/JTION CJUT^^-HA THAT. Ih' jlFFLCT. ..hL.OGKD
THJs KD'GIBLri I-AJn'0. .:/i POOL. AlVD (?) BY :;UCIALIZIL-G KA^^'.-O:^
AIJ^ED AT RKTAII'IING ].0m: KrJ'Bi.iS IN TKi. COir/r.RSIOK FaCO-So.
2 . 5 V/HEN BUFFERING. Ll'IYBXIHG ATO FORr.CASTING TO KOT PROTECT TKLI R
T]LCHin:GAL CORES FiO.' n.Iv'YI.-^On.-.i-.NTAL FLUCTUATIOIIS. ORGAiaZATICNS
UliDER K0:-^""-3 OF RATIOE'/J^ITY RESQRr TO RATIOn.NG.
The possible inabilitj' of the Amy to obtain the mCTbers and skills
required s\i{rgests that the above proposition must be addressed. The
Army may need to resort to a system of priorities delineating the most
important elements of the core technologj' that must be manned ver^^us
those elements which have lesser significance and can more afford short-
falls. The mix of active duty forces vers\is standby reserve forces
attains increasing attention at this staf^e. "Civilianization" of here-
tofore military roles including- the contracting of comnercial services
formerly performed by militarj-- units will receive greater attention.
Kurt Lang notes that contracts are in actual practice in many areas,
•with contracted services ranging from food preparation to air transport
and scientific research. It is sometimes forgotten that every military
activity'-, including fighting, has been performed at one time or another
by personnel in a contract relationship. The relative advantage of
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contracting^ for an activity, or even attracting conpetent personnel
by wa.y of In teral recriiit-aent, as ac?-inst having it perforred by pro-
19fessional military men alvays has to be connidereri. ' Adcec research
and developpent to\yarf] achieving a r'lore capital-intensive core tech-
nolo^ becomes increasingly important. The scope of o\ir attention
i.s further broadened by the expjnination of corft technology' f;lenents
themselves. ?his is identified as an "interr^.l reassessment."
SCKIIARIO K ; AS PRIOR STiUTl^GIES FALL SHORT OF I:A T^O'.^^:R PHOgURhJjiKT
GOALS, 'nii-: A'iiT WILL L SO'iT '^0 T i P. i^ AiqilA'L'lO:: OF ITS
GO"a'VK'^i"on" "}'.-{0C 11.33 IK_ Ti. i':3 OF I'AJ'aaLG F-'Ub'-gvi: ^i_P^ z.
TK^lA'nVii. FO :iGr: STRUC'fUiLl-.S. AM) irioVAi'IVi, 'i'. -CHig C^UjUj .
Thompson does not offer an e:^^plicit proposition dealir^g- with
regression
—
?. reversion to an earlier postulate—and yet it is possible
that regression will occur in the case study. The next scenario sug-
gests such a proposition:
SGLNARIO F ; IF THE ARIT F.AILS IK FULFILLING SUC CKSS>^ULLY TKK OBJEC-
TIVES Dli^SCnBLD IN TH r: SCi-KARIOS, IVS LmiBi-RS TAY ITNLLR-
yAK>: A STjUTJ- GY THAT STHIVLS TOR H-'.Vii.RSlON TO A FO'^'r^.H
cingro:sTANGi-^ in vmicH Tiii-. o"rgai;ization v>ill ag.-un Sx.al
OFF THE GOhTf'RSIOK r-fflGr-oS FROK L?.'VIR0N7..IJ;TAL IKFLUKI.'GhS .
If the organization cannot follov.' the "rules of the game," it nay
\,V)T to negotiate a. revised set of rules. It is significant to note
that the legislation on conscription remains in standby status.
By attempting a preliminary' match of selected propositions
with realistic scenarios, it is suggested at this point that Thompson's
19
Kurt Lang, "I ilitarj' Gareer Structure: Inerging Trends






conjectures are a reflection of an actual change jrooens. Later chap-
ters will attempt to docvL-nent and sub3tantiate tMs ansertation by
mean.T of a case study analysis that uses the scenarios, not the proposi-
tions, as referents.
The immediate task is to describe the strategy of research.
Hypotheses will be tested through the course of case study elaboration
but these are descriptive hypotheses (vith scenarios; which pernit
only an understanding- of the system of relations constituting the
phenomena under analysis in the case. They are directly valid only
for thfe case \inder investigation—a model of a systtn of relations in
action.
Tiesearch Besi^n
There have been ver\r fev.' attempts at the eyperimenta.l nanipu-
lation of orf,aninational variables
—
partic\ilarly in larpe or^anira-
tions—by social scientists, partlj-- because of the practical difficul-
ties of attaining sufficient power to introduce chanfjes or of per-
suading or^nization leaders already planning a change proerair. to
carrj-- it out vith experimental control and measurements. A corinon
alternative has been the addressal and application of an evolving- case
study in which a critical variable is easily identified.
This design has been described by Seymour Lipset and others
as a "particularizing analysis" involving description and explanation
of the single case to provide information concerning its past state
and the dynamics through which it changes and proceeds as it does.
General patterns of thought are examined in order to carry out the
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anp-ly^is of the particular case. Previously knov.-n feneralizations
are applied! in order to nake particular statement?. A diligent re-
cording of events as they occur should fulfill the task of the par-
ticularizmg analysis.
In this ctudy of the Army as it r.oves fror. ccnscription to
the ?ll-vol\mte£r force, certa.in processes, as well as structur?.l and
enviroriir.ental properties, are highlighted. Variation:? occurring within
the Army are described relative to different parts of the organization
and for a span of ti"ie since 19''!0 when r.odem conscription hef-p.n. Key
societal influences will also be noted because syste;''ic change is fre-
quently stimulated by external pressures. In esserice, this is what an
experimentalist does when he varies the conditions under ^hich a par-
ticular ijystern e.xit^ts, or vflujn ho observes the evolulion of an object
over a period of tine.
'[he product is essentip.lly "heuristic" in terns of serving to
discover or reveal, '^e potential of a specific theorj'- and inter-
connectPd schenata that may be fruitful for further research are empha-
sized.
The thesis presented is that the propositions by James Thompson
pertaining to organizational maneuvering in a changing environment pro-
vide broad and realistic inferences for strategies in adaptation although
his theories require refinement because of obtuse terminology. From his
book, Organizations in Action, the author poses certain conjectures that
?0
Seymour J'. Lipset, Fartin Trow, and James S. Coleman, Union
Democ racy (Kew York: Free Iress, 195^), pp. ?93-41^> passim .
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he suggests reqviire testing and elaboration. Selected propositions from
Thompson's conceptual frameworic on organizational rationality will be
applied in this research to a complex government organization—the United
States Army—undergoing a dramatic change process. The protlem, therefore,
is to describe, test, evaluate, and apply some of Thompson's theories in
the context of a government agency in transition from conscription to an
all-vol\mteer force. More specifically: Is there a positive correlation
between his general propositions on organizational rationality and the
dynamic processes of a complex governmental organization coping with
uncei tainty?
Utilizing standard techniques of a political scientist, the tools
of analysis consist of interviews with executives in the iiepartment of
Defense and Department of the Army, supplemented by a review of tables of
organization, budget analysis, ejamining relevant administrative structures,
history, public opinion polls, manuals, hearings, statutes, and reports
—
all with special reference to the context of the hypotheses,
21
It is hypothesized that:
(1) The propositions on organizational rationality
offered by James Thompson are relevant to a large
complex government organization.
(2) His propositions, as will be restated in the
21
These are not legitimate hypotheses in the scientific sense of
the word because many of the variables under study, such as "buffer" and
"norms of rationality," are not precisely measurable; hence, they are not
testable. Kaplan's version of "working hypotheses" appears more appro-
priate in the context of this research because their purpose is limited
to guiding and organizing the investigation. This choice recognizes a
severe limitation in one's ability to opera tionalize the concepts pre-
sented here—a point that will be elaborated in the final chapter.
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler
Publishing Company, I964J, p. 88.
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form of scenarios pertaining to the Anr.v, will
tend to operate sequentially in terms of timing
and emphasis applied by that organization,
(3) That should these propositions not achieve antici-
pated results, a new one may be added: "If the or-
ganization fails in fulfillin^j successfully the
objectives described in the prior proponitions, its
members may undertake a strategy that strives for
reversion to a former circumstance in which the
organization will again seal off the conversion
process from environmental influences."
It is assumed that:
(1) Tho conversion process (.ore technolog;,') contains a
22
stable manpower level of about 800,000.
(2) The problem of obtaining sufficient resources represents
the primary causal variable for organizational adaptation to change
toward an all-volunteer force.
It will be sviggested that there is a correlative linkajre between
proposition and scenario that corresponds to the following process model:
22
There is the growing possibility of force reductior^, on the
basis of recent political and popular moods but it v'ould be extremely
difficult to forecast the size of manpower cuts. It seems probable
that there will be slow incremental adjustments downward. The premise
in suggesting a large military force in this decade is based on the
standard explanations including crises in the Liiddle ii-ast, the cold war,
an arms race alleged to be forced upon us by the Russians, and the need to
defend weaker nations of the free world. There has been very little
questioning, let alone opposition to, the maintenance of a lar^re mili-






































(PiGejiamination of the Conversion Process)
E
Unsucce;;sl'ul?
Return to Scena-rio A
(Hypothesis 5)
"The depiction of each elenent in this nociel is not intended
to portray nutually exclusive, or aiitonomous, functions. In
reality, many elenents pre at vork simultaneoiisly. Lnphasis
by the organization tends to shift secuentially as shovn.

c:T;iPTh.R III
..CASE STULY: A],' AHT-Ti' IK TRAN3ITI0K
'Ba.cV.f round
The firpt conjecture relative to this case study was introduced
in Chapter II with '.''hompson' s Proposition 2.1 vrhich broadly emphasized
organizational strp.tegy to preserve or protect a state of equilibrium
by meann of sealing, off the organization from its external envirorjrient.
In terms of a three-step cycle (input—»co re technolo^:'-->output^ vith
respect to the Army, initial attention tp^ f-iven to the exogeno\:s cir-
cumstances that permitted the maintenance of a continuous flow of man-
power resources into the organization. It is ixciuily iipi-arent that
this objective nv?,s virtually (niranteed as long as the nation supported
a compulsory'- draft system. There has perhaps been no other national
issue of such continuing, hi^ih visibilitj-^ as Selective Service. It
v.'as the law of the land almost continuously since 19'|0 and has fifiired
in ever^r major war this countrs'^ has foufht since the Civil V.ar. It has
been studied and restudied by military experts, Congressional con-.nit-
tees, groups of private citizens, and Presidential Coirjnissions.
As will be shown shortly, popular and political support are
thoiight to be the pervasive stimuli for the establishment and contin-
uance of this t^i'pe of "seal" separating the Army from a competitive
labor market since 1940. In describing this phenomenon, the capsulized




SCQURI O A; TTO: AIST V/AS ABLK TO hTTSURK THJ:: EYI^'AJgc GOirTII.TJITY OF
ITS COJr/'i.iiJiON l-RGC.-.SS BY Rr-oOi:'!' TO A CO'. f'CLoO':rf tlUt? .
• Throughout j\n;e;rican historj', both state and federal govern-
ments ha.ve copipelled service to r:eet emerf-encies, Kevertheless, a
permanent and comprehensive peacetime draft, such as we have known
after '.Vorld ,.'ar II, i? a recent departure from this precedent. 'iT-ere
is little to be gained beyond a verj'' brief review of the historical
antecedents of modem domestic conscription. Although George V^ashington
asked for a draft lav/ during the American JJevolution, no such law was
passed.
It was earlier indicated that the first s^rsteri of compulsory'
service began in 1863, bom of necessity, but far short of being co^n-
prehensive. The draft 1»v/ under v;hich men were called to the Union
Army was based largely on a oxiota system in that each sta.te was re-
quired to furnish a certain mwiber of men per month. If the nimber
could be obtained through volunteers, the state did not have to issue
a draft call. Because the draft v,-as unpopular, sta.tes preferred to
offer bounties and bonuses for men who agreed to serve. In theorj-,
the South had universal conscription; because of a wide range of eycnp-
tions, however, only l./| per cent were conscripts out of 1.2 million
who served in the Confederate Arrr.y.
The United States has traditionally relied upon voluntary'
recruitment to provide manpower resources in time of peace, with the
professional cadre being augmented in time of war by militiamen, re-
serves, and conscripts. The notion of a large standing army was not
accepted in this countrj'- until the present centurjf as a conseqiic-nce of
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our intensive and prolonged involvement in international crises in-
cluding warfare, llilitary conscription has rarely been a popular
procedure except in certain times of national fervor. kost young
men have not viewed the prospect of leaving home and bein^ shot at
with any great enthusiasm. Before V/orld V/ar I, America was considered
a haven for those who wished to escape forced service in the amies
of Europe where compulsory service was bom and where it was a cus-
tomary part of life. By use of the draft during World Viar I, however,
the United States had accumulated over four million men under arms at
the end of the war just prior to demobilization.
Not until after the passage of the Selective Training and
Service Act of 1940 was it deemed necessary for this country to under-
take a peacetime draft and this was a departure from the rapid post-war
demobilization that had previously occurred throughout our history.
After World War II this law was allowed to expire in 1947 with the
objective of returning to the long-standing policy of small, voluntary
peacetime forces. But the respite was brief. By 1948| the combination
of difficulties the Services were having in recruiting adequate per-
sonnel and the military requirements of the cold war led to a reinstate-
ment of peacetime conscription.
The short and unsuccessful experience with volunteerism after
Conscription is meant to include all forms of forced service
when the force derives from the power of the government which is
raising the military services. The definition is taken from Vincent
Davis, "Universal Service i An Alternative to the All-Volunteer Armed
Services, " in The Military and Ainerican Society, ed. by Stephen '£,
Ambrose and Jajnes A. Barber (New York: Free Press, 1972), p, 221.

4/1
World V/ar II provirles an interestin(f and inr^tructive precedent on the
problems involved in attempting to attract lar^je number;-; of enlintees
in peacetime. The experience included various chan^-er in organiza-
tion and discipline undertaken at the recorjnondation of the Doolittle
Commission in order to improve morale and encourage enli.stments. As
soon as the collapse of the Japanese forces appeared iinrrinent, the
\7ar Department began to develop a nationwide recniiting program. T]-iere
were three distinct phases of the venture betv.-een 1945 2.nd the resviir.p-
tion of Selective Service in 194G» The first phase demonstrated a
great dependency on the Selective Service, and in realit;i', recruit-
ment played a secondary role in Selective Service. The r-econd period
was characterized by the Aimy's attempt to replace Selective SejTvicc
v'ith an effective recruiting program. The terminal phare consisted
of various reevaluations of, and changes in, the recruiting policies
which ended in failure of the recruitment effort to attract sufficient
numbers of men and women into the Army.' Ji.ven with a vigorous recruit-
ing campaign and efforts to make the Army more democratic, volunteer
enlistments were belovr manning goals and therefore the draft was re-
sumed in 1948. It is evident that primary attention was given to
measures affecting what we have earlier described as the input side
of the conversion process model while massive personnel egress was
2
The phased approach in the 1940s appears sxipportive of the
second and third hypotheses presented in tha.t a sequence of actions
was undertaken vmtil it became necessarj'- to revert to conscription in
order to meet manpower needs. Some similarities with the current
situation will be alluded to in later chapters, interviews witli Army
spokesmen convey the impression that current circumstances are far
different from those of the 1940s. They believe that the recent sub-
stantial raise in military compensation is a paramount difference.
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5taking place at the opposite end.
The modem Military Selective Service Act of 1967, was a
comprehensive statute designed to provide an orderly, efficient, and
a fair procedure for marshalling the available manpoTrer of the country
by a relatively autonomous organization; and to impose a common obli-
gation on all physically fit young men. It was calculated to function
in times of peril and was designed to provide men for the Armed Forces
without delay. The courts norr'-.ally did not attempt any interference
with the organization of the Selective Service Systeni. On frequent
occasions, judges praised the patriotic efforts of the unpaid personnel
of the system. It was held that Selective Service Regulations had the
force and effect of law. It was also held by the courts that, when
Congress substantially reenacted the provisions of the 1940 law, the
administrative regulations interpreting and construing the act (which
had long continued without substantial changej were considered to have
Congressional endorsement. Thus local board officials were delegated
Rocco M. Paone attributes this failure of personnel retention
to the following elements: (1) The G.I. Bill induced veterans in large
numbers to leave the Service for education, (2j Inadequate militarj--
housing, (3) Assignment policies that caused instability, (4J Long
working hours, (.5) Slow promotions, (,6) Unattractive xirJLforms, and
(7) Insufficient pay. "The Last Volunteer Army," I.'i1 i t-•^ rs*- Revi ew
.
XLIX (December, I969J, 9-1?.
The basic law has been amended several times since 1948
including three changes of Title. Prior titles were: 1948-1951
—
Selective Training and Service Act; 1951-19^7—Universal iJLlitary
Training and Service Act. lv;aterial contained in this paragraph has
been taken from Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, Legal Aspects
of Selective Service, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
January, 1969A PP* 1~4»
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significant discretionary pov,-er. About /i, OOC local draft boards
administered the la-.r and selectively called up men to fulfill their
quotas. Under the provisions of the Act of I967, Congress had the
po7/er to enlist the manpower of the na.tion by conscription both for
the prosecution of ?. v,-ar and for a peacetime army. It was a prevail-
ing viftv by many at the time that the pov.er to wage v^ar succesrfully
v/as not limited to combat action, but extended to every matter and
ever;/ activity related to war v/Viich affected its conduct and prog^ress;
that the Congress v.as the judge a,s to whether a clear and present dan-
ger exinted requiring the enactment of a selective service law.
The public has more or less accepted the need for a large stand-
ing force since the 1940s. Some of the reasons have a.lready been ad-
dressed, 'i'he global competition with the Communists is only a partial
explanation for the larger peacetime forces; the other part of the
explajmtion is that, with the development of long-range vreapons, the
United States is nov vulnerable to the possibility of outside attack
in a vay that never existed at any earlier tine in our history. Con-
scription of v.-hatever form has typically been used whenever no com-
bination of incentives and inc-ucements was adequate to raise the
number and kinds of militarj-- services vhich the goveniment felt rere
needed.
5In a survey of ninety-one countries, m.ore than two -thirds
were found to have some kind of compulsorj'- militarv-- service. Some
of these systems v.ere universal, while others, like our o'-rn selective
service system, were selective in that only some of those eligible
were reouired to perform actual service. Terrence Cullinan, "l.ational
Service Programs Abroad," Current History, IjY (Augxist, 19^6), 97»

/J
ioT ovf-r thirty ye.ar.s, the Axrny rn^mj-'Ower j-jrocurement has been
a nix'-jd nysteFi: partially volunteer, but with a sif:nificant proportion
of draftees. It nliould he r.oted that rr^hny of the volunteerc h?ve been
draf t-i-otivated, and enlisted only under the imninent threat of being
drafted.
yvblic Jood
'While there was endorrjenent for a large standing force by the
majoritr/ of Americans as a legitimate end, the meanr to achieve that
end becane increaninfly controversical. Unease over the impact of
selective conscrirtion on eouity and social goals, pnd spreading; mis-
trust of presidential direction on military operations, r.ade abandon-
ment of conscription and iFii^o.-^ition of Congressional control over its
resun;ption a tempting- alternative to the manpower policy of px'ior years.
The conscription pystein was subjected to increasingly heavy criticism
in the late ISoOs not just fropi youthful opponents of the Vietnam war,
but frori other sectors of Anerican society,'. I-'.ost of these critics
focused on the unfairness of the system, v/ith unfairness being measured
and anr.vered on several sets of criteria. In consepuence. Congress was
faced with a dilfcuima: How to respond to an apparent strong national
sentirnc-nt for major revision of the draft—or even its outright aboli-
tion—vithout compromising the fundamental security needs of the United
States.
For a sampling of public sentiment, seven Ga.llup and }!arris polls
betvreen I965 ^.nd 197'^ will be presented. A graphic display of changing
atti tildes in this time frame would provide the reader with an optimal
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profile for research but there is a constraint in evaluation and com-
parisons by the problem of differing questions presented by the poll-
sters. ' t'hile the inferences i'ro~ these polls may be reasonably clear,
the individual quentions must be repeated for the reader.
Respondent;:; '.cere asked by Gallup in September 19^5» for exam-
ple: "f.'o\ild you favor or oppose requiring: all physically fit youn/;
men, v;ho cannot pas? an educational test, to serve at least one year
perfomin^.' some other form of r.ilitarj'- service?" The response ras
83 per cent favorable and 12 per cent in opposition. ' This fin.-'irj is
somewhat peripheral to immediate interest because it focuses on one men-
tal set a.nd what is assumed by some as an inequity in the rules of the
Selective Service System. Kevf.rtheless, it represents a vast prepond-
erance suTiporting- conpulsory induction for this particular group.
Kine months later in June 19^6, Gallup posed the follovinp
q,uestion: "Do you think the present draft system is fair or not?" The
response vas the least favorable ever recorded by Gf.llup during a war
period. Those respondents believing the system fair represented 45
per cent v'hile 38 per cent regarded it as not fair. C-allup pointed
out that the sane ouestion in 195? provided a 60-11 ratio with the
Significantly, there was no debate or opposition to the
extension of the Universal I'ilitary Service and Training Act in 1555f
1959. and 19^^? according to The Report of the President's Commission
on an All-A^olunteer Armed Force, p, lC-2.
n
The Gallup Folitical Index , Report I'imber 4» (September,
19^5)> 1^« The remaining, or balance, percentage has been omitted in
this a.nd subsequent references to specific polls because they are all
represented by either no opinion or uncertaintj,"-. ror e>:ample, the
gross findings above (a national sampling vithout regard to classifica-




remAining- (and rather lar^ej ?9 per cent registering no opinion. A
broarier inference is gained from the question thp.t van next presented
in the 19^6 poll, i.e.: "V.'ould you fp.vor all younf men to five tro
years of service—cither in the nilitary forces, or in non^nilitaiy
v7orV here or abro.arl such ar the Peace Corps?" The proportion ras
7? per cent in favor and ?1 per cent opposed. Gallup then asked:
Suppose all youn.c men were required to ^ive t^-o years' service, vould
you rather have a r.nn of yours ser</e in the Armed iorces, or in ron-
militarv' v/ork?" I'orty-seven per cent favored nilitary service nhile
28 per cent preferred non-:^ilitary functions. 'Ihe following ouestion
on the subject, deriA'^ed fron the previous year (19^:5), ^as added to
the report: "iahould every able-bodied /iinerican boy 18 years old be
reouired to go ir.to the Amed Forces for one year or not?" '.?hose
favorin^^;: compulBor;)'- nervice represented ^5 per cent of the saripling
and 31 per cent ^-ere opposed. If one ip persuaded that all of these
samplings are representative of American attitudes, it is apparent
that the majorit^'^ of the American public supported compulsory seirvice
of some kind in the mid-19^>^p«
Similar ouestions v-ere not again presented by Gallup until
19^9* It is again emphasi?;ed that only inferences, not direct com-
parisons, can be drawTi because the questions about to be described
differ in content vdth those offered in I966. Contrarj' to rhat has
been implied in the prelimir^rj"- remarks of this section, the first
tr^o ouestions pose some surju'ising responses. Gallup offered in
?he
^





Januar^' 1969 the rr.oMt basic and ^-ermane question for our research,
i.e.: "After the Yietnam war in over, do you think the United states
should do away with the draft and depend upon a professional military-
force made up of volunteers or do you thinV the draft rhould be con-
tinued?" '-^ne draft ra- favored bj' a ratio of 2 to 1 v.ith 62 per cent
and 31 V^- cent ri5'5pectively. 'I'o the Question of v/hether or not all
men should give 1 yfc-=r of service (not necessarily military^ to their
countr>', 79 per cent v,-ere tabulated in favor and 1<^ per cent were
9
again;: t.
Louis Harris provides in September 1970 the first appreciable
drop in popular support of conscription v.ith the question: "Lo you
support the idea of an all-volunteer Army, or \"ould you rather see the
present conbiriation of a dr?,ft and volunteer.- ccntinue?" Since the
respon.so categories are different from those presented by Gallup, they
nre sho-'n as follows:
Vvomen Respondents
/I? per cent for volunteers, 47 per cent for combination, 2 per cent
for some other combination
Ken Respondents
50 per cent for volunteers, 4? per cent for combination, 2 per cent
for sopiG other combination
q
'
'I'he Gallup Opinion Index: Politicnl, Social and bconoric 'Jrends,
Report L'lmiber 4'U (February, 19''9)» P« 4. An interesting querj,' regarding
v/omen \-as also presented. Q. "..ould yo\i favor 1 year of service for
women to give ser\rice to the nation—in nursing or some other public
help?" A. 44 per cent favored and 49 per cent objected.
The Ilarrir. Survey: Yearbook of ]T)"blic Opinion 1970' A compen-
dium of Current American Attitur'en, (Lew Vork: Loiiis riarris and Associates,
I97IJ, p. B6. 'nhe puote is not identical 'vith that listed in the text
and is altered in foi-mat only to facilitate explanation and save space.
The figures, identifiers, and categories are identical however.
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'JTie no3t recent poll on thti subject (again with only periph-
eral relevance^ was published in early 197'' by Gallup vith the question:
"Would you favor or op^o^e requiring' all youn^ r.en to £;ive one ye?r of
service to the nation—either in irilitary forces, or in non-milita,ry
work here or abroad, puch as VIoTA or the ?eacfc Corp???" The proportion
v/as f>B per cent in favor and 25 per cent opposed. Thi?= is a verj' slifht
chanf^e fron a response in 1970 to the same question vhich yielded 71 yer
cent and 20 per cent respectively.
In PiunTiarizinc the only opinion data that has been readily ac-
cessible on the .subject, the resultn of the polls are not particularly
inpressive. 'I'hey are n':ither narrow onouph in language content for pur-
yones of this research nor are they reflective of a strong and grot inf
popular mandate for en'iin/^ the draft, lerhaps Anericanc had becor.e- r^o
accustomed to oonscrij.tion over the years that they were t-ither not in-
clined to think in tern.s of sonethinp different, or they v,ere distrust-
ful of the possible ra.inifications ensuing fron any alternative of rain-
taininf^ a larpe military' force. ' Official statements and actions by
The Gallup Opinion Index; Political, Social an^^ r^conoric
Trends, Report liumbers 81 and 62, (iiarch, 197" and Aufaist, 1970), pp.
22 and 27 'respectively.
12
There were, and still renain, many sources of opposition to an
all-volunteer force. For excellent writinf.s on the pros and cons of vol-
unteerisrn, see: George H. \.'alter, Let's iind 'L'he ])raft I er-r^, (Kew York:
David > cXay Co., Inc., I967); John 1 1. S??oniloy, The >ilit-r<- i.5ta.blisb.nent,
(Boston: Beacon Press, I964); Jares C. Filler, 111, ed. ..hy The L'raft?
(r>altinore: Penguin j5ooks. Inc., 19f8j; Gerald Leinv-'and, ed. The Draft.
(l>;ew York: '"ashington Scuare Press, 1970); Thomas Reeves and Karl liess.
The i.nd of the Traft. (Kew York: Handom House-, Inc., 1970); Harrj' A




politicHl leaderfj that are fiescribed in the- next section may have *
nerved as catalystr; for s'-^ayin^ public opinion.
There is the inclirip.tion to believe that circiinstancea in the
latR I96O3 and early 1970s brought about a chan^je in general attitude.
The change in public mood ref;a.rding the draft became no3t pronounced
during the latter stages of A''.erican involvement in Vietnam. One nust
be wars'- in analy?,ing the severe criticiRr". of our ijelective Service
System, per se, because it v-ar difficult to sort out opposition to the
Vietnam var fron opposition to the draft itself. As ] orris Janowitz
concludes J
iarpdoxically, the prolonf-.tion of hostilities in Vietnam
served only to speed the end of con-^cription. . . Terminating
conscription vas one issue on which antiwar Congressmen an^^^
pressure groups could \inite with the I'lixon AdTiinistration. ''
Assuming that such a trend was actually realized and is a con-
vincing phenomenon, then how was this r.ood translated into political
action tov.ard ending the draft?
Policy Devolorncnt—A I'andate For Change
Actions to end conscription, in fact, preceded any perceptible
large-scale public sentiment for an all-volunteer force by several
years. In 19^4 ^or example, tv.'o events occurred that helped generate
interest in ending compulsorv militarj"- service. The first v^as Senator
Barrj' Goldwater who as the Republican presidential nominee, advocated
the abolishment of conscription. The second was a Pentagon study on
1^
'Janowitz, "Volunteer Armed Foi'ces and Lilitarj'^ Purpose,"
Foreign Affairs, L (April, 197? j, 4?7.
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military manpower procurement alternatives.
A nunb'^r of inf^ependont studies also preceded any substantive
policy formulations. In 19^1, two non-rr.ilitary conmigsions examined
the subject. The first v.'as the Clark panel appointed by the House
Armed Servicer' Cor.mittee; the second wa.s the I'^rphall Commission
appointed by Iresident Johnrion. TVie r.ore recent Irtnicent's Cormission
on an All-Volunteer Aimed Force was convened by President 1 i>on in l$-9«
Subsecuently in 1971» Conpregsiona.l hearings were initiated in the
respr^ctive armed services conjriittee.<=;.
The prospects of chan/ring to an all-volunteer force v. ere seen
as appealing to the major political pa.rties as well. Lan^a^e per-
taininr to the possibilitjr of replacinf the draft va? inserted in the
Rppuhlican platfoiTfi during- Goldwater's campaifn in 19^4* '-I'he words
were rtrengthfcncd in the Republican platform of 15''6 v/ith: "V.hen
militar^r Fianpov^er needs can be appreciably reduced, we will place the
Selective Ser\ace System on standby and substitute a voluntarj' force
throv.fh adequate pay and career incentives." In a paid political
broar'cast on radio and television October 1968» tLcha.rd J.'ixon came out
15forcefully in favor of an all-volunteer force. "..ith the election of
^itioted in Conirrer^f^ional (Quarterly Alna.nac, 9^d Conrress, 1st
Session 1971t a>'V11, (.ashing, ton, U.C.: Confi-ressional Quarterly, Inc.,
197-'')» p . ? 57 • '-'he presidential platform of the Democratic Farty first
included the phrase about the all -volunteer concept in 19^8.
15^
Hichard I,!, llixon, '"Jlie All-Volunteer Armed Force," An address
given over the CBS Network, October 11, 19^8. Three sentences of that
speech are particularly appropriate to our study, i.e.:
"The military/ seivices are the enployers today 'vho don' t have to
compete in the job market. Supplied by the draft v.ith the ranjower
they vant when they want it, they've been able to ignore the laws of
supply and demand. But 1 say there's no reason why our milit^arj' should
be exempt from peacetime competition for manpower, any more tha.n our
local police and fire departments are exempt."
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the {epublican presidenti?! candidate later in l')C'd, thi? plank of 'the
platform wan seen by many as a nandatt- for the end of conscription.
Wo nonths after ,*'r. Nixon vas inaufi^x'ated, he n.i],ointed a l|)-".an
presidential comnission, headed by foi-ner Defense- .'iecretar;', '/nonas
S. Gates, to v.ork out plans for conversion of the Amc-d Forces; into an
all-volunteer force. The "Gates Com'.iesion" »/as charged by 1 resident
Nixon with eyanining the volunteer military concept (but no other al-
ternfi.tives), detemining if it was economically feasible and, if so,
recommending the techniques for implementing it. Vhe Coraiif^sion re-
ported its recorrjnendation.-^ to the president in Kebruary 1970.
Resort to an all-volunteer force became increasingly attractive
follovv-ing the persuasive recoirunendationri of the Gates Commippion based
on its concluf^ion that total volunteerism was both desirable and feasible.
Among the main points held by the Commission were:
Vi'e unanimour^ly believe that the nation's interest will be better
served by an all -volunteer force. . . Vi'e have satisfied ourselves
that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and
we believe it will have a beneficial effect . . .
The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Arried Force, p. iii. The specific recoriraendations toward achieving a.n
all-volunteer force were:
"1. Raise the average level of basic pay for military persorxel in
the first two years of servace from ;;'160 a. month to y?15 p- month, the
increase to become effective on July 1, 1970. This involves an in-
crease in total compensation (including the value of food, lodging,
clothing, and fringe benefits^ from c?01 a month to S457 a r:onth. The
basic pay of officers in the first t^vo years should be raised from an
average level of i;4?8 a month to ';57C a month, and their total compen- •
sation from S717 a month to ?669 a month.
2. J'ake comprehensive impi-ovements in conditions of militarj^ ser-
vice and in recniiting as set forth elsewhere in the report.
3. Establish a standby draft system by June ^0, 1971, to be activated
by joint resolution of Goi\c^ress upon x'equest of the President." (p. 10}

'jb
Concurrently, .Senator I.ark Hatfiel'5 introduce-^ legislation which, if
pa.^scid, vronld have put into effect the principal recomnendations made
by the Coinr.in.~ion. Tl'ie reconnendations were in contrast to the nega-
tive conclurionH on feasibility bj' the earlier '.arahall Commission
17
and Clark panftl.
VtMle accepting;- the Commirsion's reconniendations in principle,
the Administration adopted a different timetable for reasons tha.t *ill
be described below. The Con-iFiisRion had sugfrested an end to induction
authority by ZvnQ 30, 1971> 'but the President soiight a tvo-year exten-
sion to July 1, 1973« '-'"'hG President's request for delay at that tine
18
var?! a hotly divisive issue in Congress.
17
'i'he Clark panel concluded that such an Amy would entail:
(ij "nce-'taint;/ anvi inflexibility in the syste;,, y?) L;-.orLitant
expense, ("^ {eprehensi1)le jud^rient in placing monetary' value on the
lives of citizens, (.4) '-"ne creation of national defense based on
essentially mercenaries, and (5J Ab".ndon."ient of faith in citizens to
rally to the nation's defense when national security.' is threatened.
Cited by I'.ariTiion, The Case A^ain-'-t a Volunteer Amy, pp. ?9-3C.
1 p
President Kixon cautioned that the draft could not be ended
prematurely. In his January 1971 message to Congress he stated:
"While 1 an confident that our plan will achieve its objective of
reducing; draft calls to zero, even the most optimistic observers
agree thp.t we would not be able to end the draft in the next year
or so xvithout seriously weakening our military' forces or impair-
ing our ability to forestall threats to the peace. . . 1 propose
that this Congress extend ind\iction authority/ for two years . . .
V'e shall make ever<r endeavor to reduce draft calls to zero by
that time, carefully and continually reexamining our position as
we proceed toward that goal."
(>uoted in teyort to the President; Progress in i-nding the Draft
and Achieving the All-Volunteer Porpc, : elvin a. Laird, Secreta.ry




At the Rtron^T urging- of tho Administration, Cor.fress finrlly
af^rf-ed to a tvo-year flelay and th^n approve'? ^substantial pa;' increases
for first-teiT! nilitar;/ personnel alonfj with additiona.l ocnuses ar.i?
incentives. 'C^nene fimdn vere desi^med to expand recn!itir.£;- efforts
with an overall objective of endin^f draft callf-r by June 1975 so tn.-.t
the all-volunteer force concept nif'ht then be iriplemented.
Events in the interim enooirraffcd -the Aoniniatr^. tion to revise
the June deadline. Vilien the attcn-ipts were ma'-'e in 1970 to pliase ou*.
conscription in favor of an all-volunteer amed force, draft induc-
19
tions averag-ed over 16,0CC per month. f'ilitar;'- manpo"''er needs v.-fcre
hif;h and futxire needs v/ere uncertain. These elements con'rtituted
serious impcrlinents to orderly planning in th^. initial sts^es, but
developments c-voiving between 197<^ imJ 197? sti:nulateci ti;c Adiiiiius-
tration to end the dm ft earlier th-'^n scheduled. The nirdnishin^.
involvement in Vietnam resulted in reducing military marpov.er need-,
and an intensified recruitment campaign that seemed to attract greater
interest in the ServJ^ices among potential recruits in the general P'Opu-
lation accelerated the timetable.
These influences are reviewed here fro;- the historical perspec-
tive of events from 19'^0 v.lth foci:s on the transition year? 1970-1973.
Draft calls, force levels, and voluntaiy enliatr-ents ars presented
graphicallj'- as an indication of significant ch-nges that -ere taking
19Monthly inductions peaked at 30,000 per month during the
19fi5~19'^6 period of escalation in the Vietna.Pi v:ar. About "5 P^r
cent of the C million who served in the American Armed Forces during





place. The decline in draft inductions shown in Fi^re ?, particularly
during: the past 5 I'^-^-^^t '^as clof^ely related to reductions in active
FLc ?. —Draft Inductions, All Services, Fiscal Years I96C-73
Males (hundreds of thousandr.
j
A
19^.0 61 G? 63 64 65 G6 67 68 69 70 71 7? 73
Sources: I96O-7O, 3ept. of Defcnr-e (Comptroller j, Lirector^ '
ate for Information Operations, "oclected : anpower
Statistics," (April 1% 191?), pp. 50-5?. 1971-75,
Jjept. of Defense, I'anpo"'er and Reserve Affairs,
(Februarjr, 1973;
manpo"ver over this pei'iod. Bot'n Figures 2 and 3 f-^e reflective of this
correlation. Fron a peak active total force level of 3 '55 nillion in
1968 (at the height of the Vietnam war) military strength declined to
about 2,3 million by June 197^ <'^nd currently ? .2 million as shown in
Figure 3 on the follo-ving page. ?he improving circumstances occasioned
by the declining need for such a large standing force greatly enhanced
the prospects of achieving an all-volunteer force. The force level in
1973 is the lowest it has been since 1950 and represents a precipitous
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40 per cent drop between 19^3 and 1973
•
?0




I960 61 6? 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 7>' 73
Sources: 19''0-71, Dept. of Defence, "Selected }.'a.npower statis-
tics," p. ?1; 197?-73, he pudret of the Uni ted
yt.a tf.c! Govvm'^'f-nt, Kirtcal '•'ear l^.'/, '^. ''1.
With a loivtr active force level, the need for new recnvits also
declinetl to pre-Vietnam leveln. The kf^y coii^id err- lion for thfc volujiteer
concept in the transition period v,'as whether, in tht ahsence of conscrip-
tion, sufficient "true" volunteers v.lth appropriate oualifications
would step fonvard. The t^nie volunteer is defined ivithin the context
of a nan who frfcely chooses to enter the military forces in the absence
?1
of a draft threat. The grov;th in true volunteers as a fraction of
?0
rldv/ard il. Fried, et al, Setti ng Ilation^l Triorities; The 197'!
Budp-et, ('..'ashing ton, B.C. : ]?rookinfs Institution, 197?J, pp. .-96-298.
21
Estimates of true volimteers are based on lottery data during
the calender years 1970 throu^.h 197? for those elif.iblos who h;^d not yet
received lottery' nnnbers in a study conducted for the Senate. U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Coriiriittee on Anned Services, All-Yolunteer Azr^ed Force ;
l'rof;rerp~ Probloms and Irospecti, 'Report by I Martin I^inkin and John J).
Johnston, 9?d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. B-
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total enlistoents is .<;hown in Figure 4, The important result is the
Fig. 4.—Tot?l '.'lie and 'I'rue














All -Voli-nteer Force snd the :-;r.c] of the '^r.-ft,
Speci?l Report of Stcretar,- of Defense ^lliot
L. Richardson, Llarch 1973jf F* 3»
attainment of an estimated level of true volunteers in Fiscal 1973
that approximates the totpl male enlistment nefds projected for Fiv<^cp.l
1974 (354*000). With particular reference to the Army, the data indi-
cated some anticipated phortfallr^. In 1972, for example, the Aimy
received 110,000 true volunteers representinf; only 73 T^^ cent of their
total enlistments. Their projected needs for the year beginning Julj'
1973 were If?, 000.^^
2?
The All-Volunt»-"er Force ?nr! the j'.nd of the Draft, op eci al




Scenario A becarae inoperative on JanuArj' 2"], 1975 vfhen the
focifier Secretary of Defenne, Kelvin Yi. Lair": stated:
V/ith the signing of the peace r.greement in laris . . . the
armed forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer „,
Roldiers, airmen and marines. The use of the draft is ended.' '
Thu-s the concern i3 v'ith the specific measures unf?ertaken bj
the Amy in it.T effort to adapt to an exogenou-^ n:andate. I'he con-
ditions are nov.' establir^hed for the introduction of Scenrtrio 3, and
the next chapter begiriT, "ith the recognition th--'.t Arny planr.ing for
thin contingency began several yean before J.^.ird's announce^-ent.
2 "5
Reported by Lfivid K. /losenbauii, "Kation Ends Lraft, Turns
to Volunteers," in New York Timer, January ?.Q, 1313, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
A STRATr^GY FOR ADAPTATION—CHANGE PLAKNIKG
A Theoretical FramcT'ork
The fact that the Secretary of Defen.-e could make his historic
annoimcement ending the draft to sustain a large standing Eilitary
force, particularly ahead of schedule, suggests not only the effects
of some changing external conditions which h-ive just been presented,
but also implies a deliberate and concerted planning process within
the Army that began well in advance of the decision. This observation
will be explored and tested in light of the following:
SCENARIO B ; BY ANTICirATING WAjIIHG POPULAR SUFPOHT FOP. THE IlRAFT ,
THE AH:-!Y ArOPT^D A PLACTING oTRATf.GY iO'R CH.'j;r,E THAT
WOULD A;j.SU'{E'. A COL'TINUOUS VOLUIiTAHY INFUT TO ITS CON-
VERSION PROCESS .
The time frame of this analysis is between early 19^9 and January,
1973.
One is reminded by James Thompson and William KcEwen that:
"Most complex organizations must adopt strategies for coming to terms
with their environment." Strategy is a matter of selecting a strategic
objective where the organization wishes or intends to be at a future
time as differentiated from "tactics" which involves the selection of
an immediate action from the organization's available repertoire. The
James D. Thompson and William J. KcEwen, "Organizational Goals
and Environment: Goal-Setting as an Interaction Process," American
Sociological Review




"future state" that comes to mind is total reliance on volunteer
service—a condition known within the Lepartaent of Defense as a "zero
draft" state.
This study of the Amy confirms the conclusion of E. Kirby
Warren that emphasis in planning by organizations today has noved from
simply change adaptation to actively anticipatiri^ and planning for
2
change. Obviously with respect to the Artsy, its environment has
determined within broad limits what its strategy must be, bat it is
in the area of resource availability that more narrowly limits the
choices of what strategy will evolve.
To achieve a fully voluntary manpower input to the conversion
process, it is necessary to devote major attention to the scheme of
inducements. Chester Barnard provided in 194B nn outline of induce-
ment characteristics which, in reality, were to become focal elements
for Army planners. The contents of Barnard's framework for "exchange"
in the inducement process consisted of, first, the need for material
inducements. As will be shown later, this factor seemed to command
most of the Army's attention initially. A second element by Barnard
pertained to the importance of desirable physical conditions and asso-
ciational attractiveness—a phenomenon later characterized by Frederick
Herzberg as part of the hygienic component of his "Two-Factor Theory"
in The Motivation to Work . Correlating with subsequent Amy state-
ments on the need for improvement in professionalism and conditions of
2
"Warren, "V.'here Long-Range Planning Goes Virong, " Systems,
Organizations, Analysis, Management; A Book of :-ieadings. eds. David I.




servioe, Barnard suggested the possible benefit3 eteasiing froB en-"
larged participation, ideal benefactions (e.g. promotions) and non-
material opportunities such aa measures encouraging distinction and
prestige.^
Hobert Katz offers some important ccrisi derations in planning
strategy that will apply in this case. He believes that two funda-
mental prerequisites to change planning are environmental and resources
analyses. To these requirements, Katz deems it necessary to add a
definition of the scope of action as well as the scheme for resource
procu-enent and deployment. Since the reader is now familiar with
environmental circumstances up to the point of decision for an all-
volunteer Army, it is first noted in retrospect, the official estab-
lishment of a special strategic planning unit within the Army for plarj
leading t0| and facilitating, the implementation of this decision. Fre-
quently when a new program is to be developed, a new organizational
unit is created and charged with the task first of elaborating the new
prograjn and then carrying it on when it has been elaborated. This
procedure, according to I'arch and Simon, usually provides* "... for
a spurt of innovative prograun-developing activity—a spurt that auto-
matically diminishes as the program is elaborated, and the task shifts
Chester I. Barnard, Orpanization and Vanafrementt Selected
Papers
,
(Cambridge j Harvard University Press, 1948), pp. 121-12?.
Robert L. Katz, Cases and Concepts in Corporate Strategy
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prcntice-Kall, Inc., 1970), pp. 347-
557» passim. The concepts of strategic planning presented by the
author are based on the practices of business enterprise but the
notion appears realistic for application to the case study. Having
identified the above elements, Katz then points out that there is apt
to be the requirement for frequent change in strategic plans and
therefore the process requires regular recycling.
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from one of planning to one of execution."
Charting a Ccvr.'v? of Action
The Gates Corraniasion finding provided the impetus for central
planning within the DepartT&ent of Defence and aanr;/' of the su'bsequent
actions taken were based on its reconmi&ndations. I.;r, Laird established
within his own offices the Project Volunteer Corr^ittee in early I969
which was to provide a working dialogue with the CoTiaiission and serve
as the link point for its data. The Corr.mittee consisted of key man-
power officials of the Defense Department. There was a consenaud in
the conclusions of the two groups regarding the feasibility of the
all-volunteer force and the principal steps needed to end reliance on
the draft. Both reconunended substantial pay increases for junior en-
listed personnel, selective pay incentives for specialists, additional
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) scholarship support, and a
greatly expanded recruiting program. The project Volunteer Committee
singularly pressed for a two-year extension of conscription in order
to allow sufficient time to phase-out the draft reliance and test the
5James G. Karch and Herbert A. Simon, Orprnizations (New Yoric:
John Mley *: Sons, Inc., 1950 j, p. 187.
The material that follows was largely supplied by Stephen
Herbits, Special Assistant for All-Volunteer Force Actions to the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense For Ivlanpower and Reserve Affairs ^Vrashington,
D.C.) in terms of intervievr.? and access to his files which took place
October-December 1975 • K^- Herbits was also a member of the Gates
Commission. Data presented in this paper without specific citations
were obtained during these meetings and are a reflection of a variety
of sources such as conversations, undated fact sheets and talking
papers, diagrams, and accounting data. The use of "fiscal year" through-
out this research pertains to 12 months beginning July 1. For example,
Fiscal 1973 begins July 1, 1972 and ends June 50, 1975.

effectiveness of a. variety of experimental progrsns including the impact
of a large pay rs.ise. Thia body continues today as the departnental
steering group responsible for directing the overall plans for the
all -volunteer force and for monitoring the effectiveness of action
7progrruns.
In their early discussions with Kr. Laird, the Army leader-
ship (Secretary'- of the Anr.y and Chief of Staff) v^as convinced that an
all-out effort inu.ot begin at once. Only 30 months remained before the
completion date the Secretsrj'- of Lefense had set. The Anry concept
was: to develop a new progrsjn; experiment with, an evaluate, new
initiatives; the removal of no-cost irritants in the Arciy', and com-
pletely carry out a program \vhich would reverse the habits of J>0 years
and raise the level of true volimteerism in the Arm;;- from the exiat'.ng
21 per cent up to 100 per cent. Since the leadership wished to pursue
these objectives in a balanced and interdependent manner, a focal plan-
ning unit was deemed necessary.
The position of .Special Assistant for the Kodem Volunteer
Army (SAirVA) and small staff was established in V.'ashington, D.G. within
the Office of the Chief of Staff in October 1970 for plamiing and
7Prior to actions recommended or taken by any of the military
services, the Committee arranged for ? series of studies, e.g.?: t?ro
youth surveys, the collection of augmented census data, enlistment and
reenlistment behavioral dat?, advertising analysis, and ten studies to
be conducted by the Services themselves. The complete cost estimates
of this transitiona-l strategy'- for the Department were about vl»9 billion'
in Fiscal 197? and about :,i.2.7 billion for fiscal 1973. :'ost of this
information with respect to the Committee is taken from U.S.j, Department
of Defense, Report to the Fresident; Progress in rnding the Dr^ft and
Achieving an All-Volunteer Force, Telvin .1. Laird, secretarj^ of Defense,
(.Washington, D.G.: Government Printing Office, 1972J, pp. 5-7.
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executing a strategy that would lead to the termination of conscrip-
tion.
The mission of SAJfVA, in broad tenia, was to develop and r.an-
age the Modem VoluJiteer Army Program. The principal gcp-ls were:
(1^ Eatablijih conditions Tfhich contribute to increasing
the effeotivpnprn of the Army as a fighting force rhile
concurrently reducing as rapidly as possible print reliance
on the draft a?, a means for producing forces for the active
Army and its reserve componenta.
(2) Raise to the jTiaximujT; extent poscible the nuinbo-r and
quality of enlistments and reenlistmonts in both the active
Army and the reserve components.
(3j Assist in increasing service attractiveness and career
motivation for both officer and enlisted personnel.
(4j Make provisions for a standby draft law to r.eet
national emergencies.
The Special Assistant, Lieutenant General Forsythe, was granted
substantial powers and authority'-. He was authorized direct access to
the Secretary of the Array and the Chief of Staff for purposes of plan-
ning as well as the reporting of progress toward reducing to "zero" the
Army's reliance on Selective Ser\'ice inductions. Headr of r.ajor Anry
Staff Agencies were directed to assign senior points of contact through
which General Forsythe could coordinate, issu<? policy guidance, and
direct action in accordance with his delegated functions. The Anny had
Q
U.S. Army, Office of the General Staff, "Special Assistant
for the Modem Volunteer Army," VV.T^hington, B.C., October ?1, 1970,
pp. 1-5* (Kemorandvim. j The follo\^'ing milestones were indicated
prior to the establishment of SA2.:VAt (IJ L'arch 19^9—A study en-
titled, "Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation (Frovidej" was
initiated within the Office of the Secretary' of Defense, {2) October
12, 1970—Secretary Laird established the goal of "zero draft" by
July 1, 1973, and (?) October 13, 1970~Chief of Staff, Ar^y, estab-
lished a list of priorities for Volunteer Army actions.
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long been accustomed to designating special units to tackle innovative
projects. The Amy Chief of Staff, General Westr.orelar.d, indicated
that Forsythe would have authority similar to that of Project Icanagers
of major weapon systems that were being developed. In addition to con-
ventional review and monitoring functions, SAluYA was required (as out-
lined by the Chief of Staff) to establish the objectives, specify
priorities for action, and guide and coordinate activities of the
Army hierarchy to assure an integrated effort. General Forsythe was
also given the power to task the Army Staff and Field Comniands for the
preparation, coordination, and execution of volunteer Amy-related pro-
grams, directives, and actions.
The unit began its activities with thirty-five officers and
men. Initial efforts coiicisted of:
a. Development of a Master Flan
b. '^Think-tanli' Research
c. Conduct of Attitude Sur^'eys
d. Experimentation and Evaluation
e. Advertising Guidance
f. Briefings
Subsequent activities within the Array leading up to the zero draft
were largely formulated and initiated within the office of SAMVA,
The Army began with a three-pronged approach to encourage
enlistments: (l) Strengthen professionalism by building positive in-
centives to service, (2) Improve Army life by reducing the negative




(3) Modernizing tho recruiting system and approach,
A change in the program of an organization—v^hether by adding
new activities or altering existing ones—involves not just a choice
process in the traditional sense, but requires a process of initiation
through which new program possibilities are generated and their con-
sequences examined. Field testing is a cciimon course of action by
many "change agents" from the social sciences for purposes of evalu-
ating (at limited investment) before such measures are adopted on a
broader scale.
Experiments on improvements in the conditions of service were
begun in early 1970 at Fort Carson, Colorado and Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii. These were initial attempts to ascertain the impact of var-
ious merit and rewird systems during the basic and advanced individual
training. As preliminary results were encouraging, three more bases
were added for innovation and evaluation. Various funded actions
were tested in order to ascertain which would have the greatest pay-
off in attracting new enlistments, raising reenlistmenta, and improving
the retention of high quality officers. Concurrently, attitude surveys.
9
These seem to correlate with earlier points in this study rela-
tive to both recruiting and socialization as necessary for sustaining
the conversion process (Scenarios C and D) but an inference is assumed
here of "image~bi\ilding" designed to portray to potential enlistees
that the Army is an attractive profession. General V.'illiam Westmoreland,
the Chief of Staff, announced a similar formula for success* (l)
Enhanced professionalism, {?.) Better life, (3) Improved public esteem.
The significance of these factors is closely allied with Barnard's
notion of inducaments described earlier in this chapter.
Test programs were broadened to include: (1) Improving pri-
vacy in barracks, (2) Providing options for combat volunteers as to
unit and location, (3) Reducing number of soldiers performing non-
military tasks, (4) Expanding the advertising programs, and (5)
Expanding ROTC and medical scholarship programs.
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reenlintment statistics, special coniraand reports, and measures of ujiit
effectiveness were adopted for purposes of analyzing the favorable and
unfavorable impact of changes. By analysis of the results, a frame-
work was to be conceptualized for the application of successful poli-
cies. Army-wide, at a later date. All comniand levels were expected
to publicize throughout the Army (as well as to the local and regional
media) these policies and tests for making military life more attrac-
12
tive to potential enlistees. It was recognized that overall enlist-
ments must be increased by 250 per cent and 700-800 per cent in combat
arms*
Early attention by the Army was directed to a recruiting
campaign in terms of structural change, advertising, and the advocacy
and adoption of various incentive prograrca requiring cipproval by Con-
gress. In the analysis of recruiting practices, the Gates Commission noted
that the number of recruiters for all Services varied between 6905 and
7571 during the 1960s with expenditures for recruiting amounting to an
A study of the British volunteer system in the military was
also conducted. The British reported that morale and efficiency had
greatly improved since the days of their draft and they concluded that
two volunteers could do the equivalent work of three conscripts.
Interestingly, the ratio of military to civilian in their Services
had changed from 5 to 1 (the same as ours) shortly after World Vi'ar II
to 55-45 today. There will be more information on "civilianization"
presented in Chapter V.
12
The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff scheduled
frequent trips for discussions with troops on this subject. It is
symptomatic of the high degree of importance attached to this strategy
by all levels including those at the top . Time-phased reenlistment
goals had also been established: (1^ Doubling the volunteer rate by
July, 1971, (2) Tripling the rate by July 1, 1972, and (5) "Consider"
quadrupling the rate by July, 1975*
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average of about one-half of one per cent of the active duty n:?.npower
budget. The Army first proposed an increase in recruiters by 55^ and
the establishment of IO5 new recruiting stations. In a speech before
the Association of the U.S. Arrr:y on October 1?, 197if General
Westmoreland stated:
We are more than doubling the number of recruiters in the Amy
Recruiting Cor.n?nd, rlecruiting stations have been increased bj''
37 per cent. Recruiters are being given cost of living allow-
ances and government-rented houses.
By the end of 1971» the Army reciniiting organization consisted of 5
districts and 39 regional stations.
Application of I onetary rlesources
A central feature (and the most controversial element with
Congress J in the Army's change planning was the quest for resources.
Experimentation, advertising, and incentives all renuired either the
reallocation of resources or the assignr.ent of additional resources.
In a letter to the military services dated December 2, 1970, Deputy
Secretarjf of Defense Packard stated:
In putting together zero draft proposals we must put dollars v.here
the problems are. The available fvmds must be used to achieve our
zero draft objectives and, in particular, to ensure thst we h?ve
adequate manpower.
17,
" The Repo rt of the President's Copmissiony p. 83. In December
1970» the Army was talking' in 27,000 new men a month with only 50 per
cent as volunteers. By 1973f the number of recruiters for all ^^ervices
had increased to ??, 000.
The Gates Commission estim?ted that its proposa.1 for adopting
the all-volimteer force in fiscal 1971 would amount to approximately
S2.7 billion, (p. S). In I968, 4I per cent of the Defense budget was
spent foi' manpower as corapi^.red to 56 per cent in 1973*
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In response, the Army proposed major actions requiring' money to be
started immediately. These included: (1^ Prime-time advertising on
radio and television, (?) Expanded recruiting force as well as sup-
porting' facilities, (3} Award of special bonuses for coabat skills
to reduce eervice irritants. James Gerhardt re-'iinds the researcher
that decisions related to manpower procurement have important impli-
cations. A decision to raise spending on manpower by a given amount
represents in part a decision not to spend that araount on other ele-
ments of military strength and needs—weapons, training, facilities,
supplies and the like. It also represents a decision not to spend
those funds on other goverrjnental activities, or not to release then
15
through lower taxes.
The Aiiay irdtially estimated a need for "IJl million in Fis-
cal Year 1971 and $718 million in Fiscal 1972 to prepare for the zero
draft in 1975 but this was later scaled down to $71 million and 8525
million respectively. Supporting the need for those funds were a
total of 50 studies (6 under civilian contract) that were undertaken
or supeirvised by SAMVA. The inclusion of behavioral science activity
is of academic interest. aAMVA created a study group in late I97I
to analyTie the use of behavioral science expertise and knowledge with-
in the Army staff. The study group visited numerous indvis trial firms
in the nation such as American Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors,
Dupont, Sears, as well as the Harvard Business School. In almost every
15
Jameg M. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in
Military Manpower Procurement 1945-197Q» P» xvi.
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case, industrial org-anizations had recently nade major reorganizations
in order to better deal with hunan resources problems. These adjust-
ments included the establishment of an office charged with Organiza-
tional Development and increased stature for behavioral sciences
research. There was frequent evidence of applying new motivational
techniques such as job enrichment and team building, as well as iising
sophisticated measures for diagnosing and improving major staff and
line corporate units. ' Several branches of the military services have
also recently undertaken projects in the application of these techiniques
but a current assessment of their efforts appears premature.
Sensing the urgency of its situation, the Army reprogramned
its own fijnds to begin field tests, enlistment bonuses, and recruit-
ing facilities. Initial funds provided to b'.y-TA were for: t;12.1
million to the Recruiting Command for immediate expansion of recruit-
ing and advertising; ^6.9 million was allocated for exploiting new
ideas; i>5» 6 million was assigned to the civilianization of food ser-
vice activities (KP^ activities in burope. The Aimy was asking for
about half of the ^1.3 billion allocated for the zero-draft effort in
17
Fiscal 197? • The money requested was to be allocated as follows:
It has been virtually impossible to uncover the extent to
which the Army applied these findings and the direct effects of that
application.
17
Aside from the pay increases which represented the majority
of funds reouested (and approved) the Army was allocated: 55155 inil-
lion for the "improvement of professionalism and Army life," and ;^59.4
million for recruiting and advertising. Advertising funds were not
simply aimed at potential recruits; the scope of operations was aimed
at the general public as well. U.S., Department of Defense, Report
to the President. Laird, 1972, p. 32.
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Programs Reducing Irritants 75.0
Selective Pay Increase 419.0
Special Pay Incentives IG.O
Total Requested $651.5 million
By early November 1971, 1800 recruiters and 5OO new stations had been
added. Over ^10 million had been allocated for nedia advertising. A
total of 39 various enlistment options were established for new re-
cruits. Concurrently, a Fiscal 1972 continuing resolution authority
by Congress for SI96 million above the Anny base budget was granted
for continuing experimentation and an expanded recruiting force from
5000 to 6080. In early 1972, the hiring of 2700 low wage rate, or
contract, civilians had returned 5500 soldiers to their primary mili-
tary skill duties.
The key to achieving progress at this time toward an all-volun-
teer force was virtually assured by partnership with Congress in Public
Law 92-129 which, on September 28, 1971, extended the draft for 2
18
years and authorized pay increases in the amount of 12.4 billion.
18
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pp.
124-295, pa.qpjm . The pay featured: iJl.S billion base pay increase
weighted heavily toward first-term enlistees and low-ranking officers;
S409.8 million bacheloT quarters alloTfance; $106 million dependents'
allowances; S20 million for various bonuses to attract critical skills;
$20 million dependents' allowances for reservists; $2.9 million for
recruiting. The base pay increase, effective November 1971, was a
major boostin compensation. In a speech before the Association of
the U.S. Army on March 22, 1972, Laird indicated that privates were
paid $78 per month in I964 at the beginning of the Vietr^am buildup.
The starting wage of 8552 for a new private in 1972 was 525 per cent
higher than his I964 counterpart.
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Military pay increases have been the most important single source of
changes in recent defense budgets despite the declining nunber of
Servicemen. The legislative decision to make military pay conparable
with that in the private sector ansounted for about three-fourths of
this increase in compensation} special pay incentives to spur enlist-
ments and an escalation in grade structure accounted about equally for
the balance. The price of defense manpower would have increased to
some extent under these circumstances whether or not the zero draft
19became a reality. ^
The impact of these actions by Congress was that military pay
was increased substantially at the entry level; recruiting systems were
expanded and modernized, and improvements were made in the quality of
military life. By early 1973» the Army shortage was only 1.7 per cent
and the Services met 97 per cent of their recruiting objectives. It was
felt that the shortfall in Army recruiting was caused primarily by the
requirement of higher entrance standards between January and June of 197}.
With the enactment of this legislation, officials of the Depart-
ment of Defense were increasingly optimistic as to the success of achj.ev-
ing a zero draft in 1973 • '^he Assistant Secretary of Defense for ilan-
power and Reserve Affairs stated:
Reasonable military pay competitiveness witlun the private sector
has been achieved by the enactment of increased military pay and
allowances . . , Pay inequities affeotinp' personnel in the lower
militarj' pay grades have been corrected.
19
Fried, et al, Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget.
pp. 296-298.
20
Congressional quarterly Almanac, 92d Congress, 2nd Sess.,
XXVIII (1972), p. 492.
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In gross terms, this may have been an impressive perfornance
but certain critical skills reqviired continuing special attention. A
bonus of GI5OO ^aa offered to volunteers who would enlist in the Amy
combat arras for a period of 4 years. The bonus was raised, for test
purposes, to S250O in Llay 1973. The results produced 4550 enlist-
ments in this specialty area during the month of June 1973—some IO5O
above quota.
In the exaraination of the statistics that have been presented
in this chapter, it has been difficult to pinpoint the flow of resources
allocated to the Department of Defense for the individual military ser-
vices and for specific transitional programs leading to a zero-draft
condition. For example, it is virtually impossible to prorate ar.ong
the military services the costs of the dozens of eTpensive studies con-
ducted in order to determine costs for the Army. Additionally, recruit-
ing costs inevitably include charges that could be leg^itiaately called
advertising although the latter is occasionally segregated for budget
purposes. Finally, improvements in salaries and working environments
are geared both to the goal of recruiting as well as a general effort
to improve service conditions in terms of modem life styles and in-
flation.
In the examination of Figure 4 presented in the last chapter
and now the strategy applied between 1970 and January 1973» it is con-
cluded that the nviraber of true volunteers rose because of a wide variety
of measures, chief among which were substantial pay increases at the
entry level and greater emphasis on recruiting. Beyond the monetary
incentives, other measures upgraded the quality of life at military
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inatallationa J barracks were modernized, >CP duties were assigned to
civilians, and additional health and dental prograaa were provided.




are now presented graphically in tenns of their effects on all of the
military services. Figure 5 shows the effect of the pay legislation
Fig. 5»—Comparison of f.'edian Weekly rlamin^^ of Civilian
Full-time Wafe and Salary V.'orkers and Weekly Earrungs of £ji-






1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1975
*-Military earnings refer to "base pay, plus allowances for
subsistence and housing and tax advantage, iirst year earn-
ings are based on a weighted conbination of the pay grades
normally attained during the first year of service. Estimate
of civilian earnings for Fiscal 1973 assumed 5« 5 per cent
increase; estimate of militairy earnings includes the January
pay raise.
SourcesJ 19^7, 1968-72, Dept. of Labor, BL3 {V&Tch, 1973);
and Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Keserve Affairs
(March, 1975) f 1968, est.
and subsequent comparability increases in January 1972 and January
1973 • Average weekly earnings of new recruits, which had lagged behind
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those of 19-year-old civilian workers by about ^0 per cent in 1970, had
attained reasonable comparability by FiKcal 197- . 'i^jond the /starting
level in manpower proctircmont, men's earning (enB.isted and ci.'ilisn)
roughly corresponded for all groups as seen in Fi*r>^ra 6. The data
Fig. 6.—Gomparipon of Median Y/eekly /."amin^ of Civilian
Full-tiriC V.'age and Salary Workers and I'ilitary Enlisted









16- ?0- 25- 55- 45- 55- ^5+
19 24 34 44
(Ago)
54 64
*i-'jLlitary earnings are not given b&yond age 54
since almost all of the military personnel are
retired by this age. Estimates of median mili-
tary salaries are based on age, pny grade, and
representative salaries for each gx\ide. However,
years of service for each age group •srag not avail-
able so that a more rigorous calculi. tion has not
been possible.
Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, CoGiv.ittee on Axmsd
Services, All-Vol )) nteer A rti.ed Forceps Fro/rress.
Problc-ms and Pronrcnt,'?, HevA-vt by Martin Binkin
and John D, Johrston, 93d Cong., 1st seas.,
1973, Figure 17, p. 22.
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may be somewhat misleadiiig and unc?erstate(5. If fringe benefits such
us tax ac3v?ntages, retirftment, comrdssary and exchange privileges, snd
medical ?nd dental services are added, the military pay advantages are
probably even more pronounced.
The combat pr-ir; bonuses plus the vlcer choice? in the selection
of training;; courses an well as iu.it and location of assignment are con-
sidered to be major factors influencing the growth of ccrbat ams
enlistments shown in figure 7«
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Sources: True volunteer d?.ts provided bj' Lavid .'/. Grissmer,
Gener.il 'Research Corporation (I'ay 197''^. Fiscal
197^* requirement from "The All-Volunteer Force and
the Fnd of the Tjrpft, " Special :{eport of Secretary
of Defense Richardson (r.arch 197? J, p. 10.
The importance of recndting and advertising were recognized
early and major changes were undertaken in those fields during the
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transition period as reflected in Figures 8 and 9- From i?iscal 1970
Fig. 8.—Trends in Department of Defense Recruiting
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Source 1 Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (January 1973)
to Fiscal-1973» the recruiting budget more than doubled while personnel
Fig. 9.—Trends in Departraent of Defensa Recruiting











Source: Dept. of Defense, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (January 1975)
involved in recruiting programs increased 70 per cent.
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According to the Adrainistration, the annual cost will be about
$3 billion in ?iacal 1974. This estimate includes only the cost of
legislatively enacted programs specifically identified with the all-
volunteer force, such as the special pay incentives authorized in
Fiscal 1972. The progression of these costs is shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
ANNUAL COST OF THE ALL-YOLUNTEER FORCh;, BY
CATEGORY, I-ISCAL YEARS 1972-74
(Total obligational authority in millions of dollars)
Category
Pay increases ..........
ROTG and health scholarships. . .
Combat azns bonus
Recruiting and advertising. . . .

































*The Fiscal 1972 costs are not for a full year because the
pay increases were not effective until November 1971.
Sources: 1972, Dept. of Defense, I'.anpower and Reserve
Affairs, (March 1973); 1973-74, The All -Volunteer
Force and the End of the Draft, Special Report of
Secretary of Defense Richardson (l<larch 1973),
p. 27.
Aa attention in this research now moves to conditions in 1973,
it will become apparent that the strategy developed and exercised by
the Army is incomplete, perhaps because of circvmstances that could not
be predicted in the early stages of this planning cycle. The number of
volxmteers, particularly in critical skill areas, is not as high as had
been hoped, and there is mounting criticism of the overall expense
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involved to sustain a large volunteer Army, These circumstance", have
forced a search for feasible alternatives in overcor.ing the shortfalls
that presently exist. Derivatives of Thompson's propositions for
adaptation to uncertainty will next he explored.

CHAPTEH V
MANAGING A CHAJJCE PROCESS
Pzritnary Adftptational iilenients
The previous chapter introduced planning and actions within
the Arniy prior to January 1973 which now serves as tackground for next
prucefding with an examination of a primary element in its implementing
effort':!—recruiting. Most of the publicity in the media as well as
Con^;re.'sional ov-^rsight statements during 1973 with respect to the
all-^volunteer force seem to devote primary attention to this element
as ail index of success and that is why the next scenario is featured
as ,'::,">tptcmatic of "primary adaptational phenomena." In other wordst
the .'success or failure of intensified recruitment has been viewed by
many aa the basic determinant, a barometer, in terms of the ability of
the /.p.^.y to achieve an all-volunteer force. This characterization is
described as:
sc;:kahio c » the arct has reallocated ani h>tohtld resources. ?.:orinKD
II'S STRUCTURE, AND ENGAGKv IN A PHOPAGANriSTIC (-/.^/.PAIGN
FOR ATTRACTING VOLUNTEERS IK 0-iDLR TO SUSTAIN ITS CON-
VERSION P.'-OCESS .
Resource allocation and apportionment features from 19^9 through
calender year 1972 were presented earlier. Of the S3«l billion budget
authority requested by the Department of Defense during Fiscal 1974 for
the volunteer force actions of all military services, about 75 P^r cent




pay of military personnel reasonably competitive with civilian pay.
There seems to be a general consensus that the nest fruitful step of
all the actions taken by the military tn-js far in te:-.'s of attrasting
volunteers has been the major pay increase-. Another 10 per cent of
the $3.1 billion covers other types of ccnpensation programs such as
bonuses for purposes of balancing off the available supply of volun-
teers with the specific Job and skill rrquirementa of the Services.
The reT.aining I5 per cent requested is to be used for expanded recrait-
ing efforts, education programs, post services, and barracks improve-
ments. Included are advertising funds earmarked for propagandistic and
"image-building" purposes. The specific expenditures undertaken or
contemplated by the Army for Fiscal Years 1973 and 1974 are presented
in the Appendix, The amount of funds and their functional apportion-
ment for Fiscal 1975 are expected to be about the s&ae as for Fiscal 1974«
Structural changes have been represented by t^o principr.l
Public attitude is a matter of serious concern to the r.ilitary.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was quote(^ as sayirr: "Un-
less the American people support the military and individuals stop
maligning it, the prospects of an all-volunteer force are di::;." "Sup-
port Called Key to All-Vol Success," Kavy Times, Septeiiber 19, 1973,
p. 57» The Secretary of the Army stated: "V.'e are going to make the
volunteer Army work by insuring that sen'ice to the country is a mean-
ingful part of the young man or woman's life." Howard H. Callaway,
"The Volunteer Arny, " Vital Speeches of the Day, November 1, 1973,
p. 55' Former Secretary of Defense Laird stated:
"The attractiveness of military ser%'ice, and the capacity to retain
qualified career people, is strongly affected by public attitudes
toward military service. It is essential that the vital role of
the Armed Forces in national security and the many challenores of
military life be projected in ways that will enhance public vinder-
standing and respect for military people, their profession, and
the uniform they wear."
U.S. Department of Defense, Report to the President; Frogreps i n
Ending the Draft and Achieving The All-Volunteer Force, p. 32.
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modifications: the recruiting sector, -Trhich i.t in cloatat geographic
proximity to the Array's "boundary transact! or-," -it the la>or aarket;
and the centi'al planning and monitoriji^ uri t rh=t was dtscribc-d in the
previous chapter as headed Ijy the Special Aasi.^tant for the i-odem
Volunteer Army ^SAJfVA). Eespite the fact that both units h&ve had
pervasive integrated responsibilities and key coordinative functions
in achieving- E.n all-volunteer Amy, it is noteKorfriy that the head-
quarters of the former was moved in June 1975 to Ch-icago e.an the des-
cendant of SAJA'A today remains in Waahing-ton, L.'J. Coordir.ation may
possibly be handicapped by this recent e*ogr?.phio separation.
The Army Recruiting Command is struct'jrcd along tho lines of
a typical large national sales organization rlth its central headquar-
ters, five district or regional staffs, and over loOO satellite recruit-
ing offices. Primary adaptational adjujtrncnts f re reflected in the
growth in nximbers of satellite officea, budget i?icreases, recruiter
bonuses, and the channelling of high-caliber Arny professioruils into
the recruiting organization. Also analc gous to a commercir-.l sales
organization is the prevalent usage and emphasis on local rscruitment
goals (i.e., "sales quotas"'}.
The central planning and monitoring v.nit represented by
SAI.rVA was dissolved in June 1972 without equivalent structural
2
In an effort to spur aggressive recruiti^-.Ent in the nili-
tary and to attract the mmber of soldiers nefdeo in this bi-anch
of the Army, the Defense lepartment ).c.-3 authorized a special bonus
of SI 50 per month for personnel assigned to tho recruitirig organi-
zation, "Recruiters Will Get $100 Fro-Pay Hike," Navy Times, Novem-
ber 7, 1973, p. 5.
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replacfe.Tient. The rationale for dissolution was that the functions of
3AMVA as a specially-designated planning agency were fulfilled when the
draft ended, and that on-going actiona could be decentralized and absorbed
by the normal Army organization. Illustrative of this philosophy during
the planning cycle was the statcaent by General Westmoreland to Lieu-
tenant General Porsythe (SAI.fVA) in early 197?: "You should continue to
phase out activities whenever we are confident that desirable new initia-
tives are fully set as lasting Army practices." Monitoring and policy-
making functions as well as further initiatives were thereafter to be
conducted under the direction of the Deputj' Chief of Staff, Personnel
(DCSPEH) in Washington.
The reader will recall from Chapter IV that SA^TA held con-
siderable power and immediate access to both the Chief of Staff and
Secretary of the Army for purposes of developing and initiating all-
volunteer programs. The current organization is a dramatic departure
from that concept by virtue both of having a Recruitment and Reenlist-
ment Division (vaguely analogous to SAMVAj several layers removed from
the Army's top leadership and with responsibilities for only develop-
ment, monitoring, and coordinative functions. At the present time.
3The details of structural realignTient were provided by
Lieutenant Colonel ;'j.chard A. Jacoby, Division of Recruitment and
Reenlistment, Department of the Army (V.'ashington, D.C.j from inter-
views on November 28 and December 3t 1975
•
U.S. Army, Chief of Staff memorandum to SAI'IVA, Washington,
D.C., January 15, 1972.
Problems of transition necessitated an interim arrangement be-
cause some of the programs developed by SAJ^'VA had not reached fruition
by the time the unit was dissolved, a small "Volunteer Army Office"
continued with the implementation of SaJ/.VA's work until September, 1973*
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DCJPi.R is the focal point and taskinff authority for all-volunteer
y\rmy sctivitier? tnit his responsibilities encorpflss many otntr func-
tions as v;ell. Under hi.T supervision are four directorates Cidrector
of ]ilitar</ Personnel I- an^.gement, Director of Plans, Pro£rrar;s and
Bud^ret, Director of Civilian Personnel, and Director of HuriSn Resources
Development; that perform duties pertaining to a variety of personnel
reouirenents. The changing structure is illustrated in 1-ifure 10 for
comparative purposes. One of the principal subordinates of DCdPi-R,
Yig. 10.—Abbreviated Comparison of 3AJ.YA and IC3Pi..-{
Organization Structures
October 1570 -June 1972 June 197?-Present
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;3A]-:VA
Chief of otaff









( Vi as hi ng ton, D.C.)
Five Districts All Army Lchelons
(l''oni to ring-Coordinating-;
Soxirce: Interview with Lieutenant Colonel ,{ichard A. Jacoby, UdA,
Division of {ecruitment and }(.eenlistir,ent, Dept. of Amy,
\.ashington, D.C., Kovember 28, 197?
•
the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ADGSPbR), reportedly has
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great autonony for the adoption of testn and experirentation anong
Array corinands. Current emphasis, howtver, is not to identify any unit
as a special entity associated v;ith the all -volunteer concept.
Hecruitinf results in the active Ar.-''- for 197' since January
have fallen short of entabli?hed goals as indicated in Table ?. Vhe
TA"^LE 2
iiriLIS'tT^KKT GOALS ATO) R!:3'JL'''S: Fktp-^.0'A^.Y-OGTO^:- •'. 1973
Per Cent*
T-'onth Goal bM-istments of Goal
February- 11, 500 10, COG 85?' (?7)
Maroh 9,500 7,?62 77 (7oj
April 9,000 4,559 49 C51j
I'ay 8,000 5,?64 64 (CO
June 16,500 15,000 91
July 17,300 13,117 76
August 17,000 13,694 81
September 17, 800 14, 596 82
October 17,?00 13,490 78
*A1 though CQ reports their figures were taken from Defense
Department sources, calculations reveal that t>:e first 4
figures in the far right column are understated by as much
as 1.9 percentage points. Correct figures are shown in
parenthesis.
Sources: February-August, Congression^.l Quarterly
, XXXI
(September 22, 197?}, p. ^5-7 J Septer.ber-October,
KavAr YiiTies, November 7, 1973, P» 41*
Assistant Secretary/ of Defense for I'anjiov.-cr and Reserve Affairs stated
that the Army will continue to fall short of its recruiting goals for
the next several months and v,'ill be between 15,000 and 20,000 men short
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by next June, o-uch figures may have to be adjusted depending on
reenlistment rates and Congressional action on possible incremental
adjustments in approved force levels.
A tally of the figures in Table 2 reveals an overall percent-
age of about 78 per cent of the manpower objective between February
and October. Additionally, it appears that the market for recruits is
aeasoiTal and subject to erratic variations between months. Therefore,
the program cannot now be run on a straight-line basis. The variances
seem to change dramatically among the months with shortfalls in April
and Kay being particularly acute. Historical data within the Eepart-
ment of Defense reveal that the period from February through IL&y are
traditionally low recruiting months, and, June through August, the
most favorable. These seasonal fluctuations seem to be generally re-
flected in the monthly goals specified in the table. For exacple, the
average monthly quota in the low period (February-V.ay) is 9450 and, for
the high period (.June-August) is 16, 935« At the present time, numer-
ical goals ^and results) do not match the numbers leavir^ the Service
7
and this immediately presents problems.' For instance, the Army's
training establishment, particularly the basic training schools, cannot
"Enlistment Shortages Expected," Washington Star-News.
November 15» 1975» P» A-4. As of September 1973» the overall active
Army strength was 24,000 below the planned goal according to: "All-
Volunteer Force Information," Special Report by the Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, October, 1973» P« 2.
7
This abnormality was caused by unusually high draft calls
during the Vietnajn war which were unrelated to seasonal considerations.
Once these draftees leave the Army and cutbacks are stabilized, it is
expected that the egress will more or less match the seasonal timing




have a steady workload and must continually adjust its program to natoh
the oscillating flow of recruits despite a constant overhead level in
staff, plant, and other facilities. There seems to be no easy ar.d con-
venient alternative in accomodating such an erratic input.
The net effect of recruiting thus far in the Amy, as sug^sted
by the data in Table 2, is that not only chortfalls exist but th^t the
flow of new manpower into the conversion process is disruptively un-
even. As Janes Thompson has stated in his proposition 2.3, rational
organizations will try to smooth out input transactions. To ccnbat
these dysfunctional tendencies which have not been curbed by the Army's
primary adaptational strategy, the organization has increasingly tapha-
sized alternative measures to assure a sufficient and level flow of
manpower.
Throufrhput Strateries
In order to achieve and maintain the numbers required in the
conversion process at a fairly steady state, the Amy has devoted in-
creasing attention to a variety of means that pertain to "throughput"
phenomena—that is, consideratioiis affecting both the flow of manpower
into, and out of, the organization. This is reflected in:
SCENARIO D t THE AKT SOUGHT 'iO BUFFK:^ INTUT TliANSAGTIONS TF^OUOHi (l)
LESS ST':nNGLNT 3KLLCTI0N CRITh'RIA THAT, IN nFFKCT. i.^TARG'M)
THE ELIGIBLE I/^AI.TOWER POOL, A?;D (2) BY SOCIALIZII.J FACI'OHS
AIlcED AT RETAIiniNG V.ORh KnV.BK.vS IK THii, COKTERSION F:-.JCj.SS .
o
The Army missed its recruiting poal in September allegedly
because it was short of recruiters—a problem that will be corrected
by December 1975 according to the Assistant Secretary of Lefcn^o,
Manpower and Reserve Affairs. "Army Short in Recruiting For 8 I.:onths,"
Washington Post, October 18, 1973, p. A-6.
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A recent r'.o-idy prepar'-d for the Senate Committee on Armed
Services has an in-.prtaaive statistic on the impact of trying to main-
tain an all-voluntsfe.'- force uncler existing selection criteria at
present strength IovhIs, If current manpower selection policies are
maintained, one ont of every three qualified and available men would
9have to volunteer for active military service,^ The recognition of
such a formidable df;::^.nd has If-d the Army to explore possibilities of
varying stlection criteria in order to enlarge the recrui table man-
power pool. The follovfing is a. listing of alternatives being exanined*
(l) Replacing military men with civilians
(2j Easii;^^ nental standards
(3) i-asing physical (including age limits^ standards
(4) Hecnii ting more vonen
(5) Recruiting men with prior service
(6) Lateral hiring
A cmnulativG estinate on the degree that such measures would enlarge
9
U.S., ConfT'i^s, Senate, Committee on Armed cervices, All-
Volunteer Armed Fo'^cf .i: Prpr^tps, Probler.s and Proapectg, Report by
jYartin Binkin and John D. Johnston, 93<i Cong., 1st sess., 1973t ?• 5«
The report optimir, ti cally statCi' that the rate at which qualified
volunteers enlisted in Fiscal 1975i if continued, should be adequate
to meet lon^j-term on.-T-.titative needs without any further increase in
costs
—
provided that there are no unforseen changes in present trends
and ci re uinstances.
The percentage of high school graduates desired by the Army
was actually raised initially after draft calls ceased but this cri-
terion was eased in July 197^^ by the Secretary of the Army. The recent
rise in percentagf' cf non-high school graduates among new recruits has
so alarmed Congress that the House Appropriations Committee has now
stipulated that no rr.ore than 45 per cent may be non-high school grad-
\iates. ^:ichael Gctlsr, "House Panel Cuts Budget For I/ilitary,
"
Washington Post, Kovember 27, 197?. pp. A-1, A^-7,
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the manpov/er market for the rr,ilitary has not been published. Tao
possibilities, as exa-mples, are presented here on rhat is either
possible or bein^ considered. The Gates Corrxiission estimated tV.at for
a force of 2.5 million men, 117,000 civilians could be substitute? for
Serviccnen at a savings of perhaps SlOO million per year. viith
respect to female recruits, the present nO, 000 militaiv women '.rill at
least be doubled by 1977 and the hope is that the current 2 per cent
of womf.n in the totsl force may grow to 10-?0 per cent, or even higher.
I»'ore than 80 per cent of all job specialities within the Lepartrent of
1''
Defense have been declared open to women.
Thus far, the emphasis in this research has been on manpower
procurrment—an input transaction. But the requirer;£nts for nev man-
power procurement can be lessened considerably if steps are t?.kcn to
retain those member?, now in the Army, for longer periods of time.
Former Defense Secretary Laird aptly stated:
The availability of draftees and draft-induced enlistments pro-
duced in the Arned Services the habit of under-urdng retention
as a means of rceting manpower requirentnts. The requirement
for new enlistments in Ai-my and Is'avj' can be reduced substantially
by improving the retention of first-teni and career personnel. '
11
The Hfpor ^; of the Prer-ident' s Oorrdsgion, p. ~i. A modtst
prog.?a"i to siihsti-'ii ',e 31»000 civilians for militaiy personnel by the
end of fiscal 197^1 is now underway.
'^The Army had a stren^^^th of 8700 militairj'- v.-omen in ?iscal
1973 ^ith a goal of 12,000 by the end of Fiscal 1974. "All -Volunteer
Force Jnfomation," Special leport, p. 7'
1^
Report to the President; Frofress in Kndii ir the Draft and
Achievin/? the All-Volunteer >'o:^ce, p. 31 •
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Stxategie-? for the enhancement of retention, a ratification
of socialization and internalization, can be far more subtle and
sophisticated than measures utilized to attract majipower from a com-
petitive labor market; yet, socializing elerr.enta are of pervasive
significance. All types of organizations will apply some degree of
both rocruitaent selectivity and socialization; they vary mainly in
the related emphasis they give to the two processes and, as a result
of their particular philosophy of operation, to attain a given level
of effectiveness and to maintain a given level of organizational Qual-
ity. Recruitment affects only initial involvement. Organizational
socialization, communication, and the experience of participation may-
change individual attitudes greatly after recruitment. Kilitary units
accepting volunteers require that the volunteer surrender his right to
quit and subordinate himself to the full scope of military law for a
substantial length of time.
Both the Gates Commission and the Army leadership recognized
the influence of various socializing factors on the all-volunteer con-
cept. The former indicated:
Pay is not the only, and perhaps not even the prirrary motivatinor
force for joining or remaining in the military services. A sense
of duty, a desire for adventure or travel, societj'-'s esteem for
military life and the general conditions of service—all affect
individual's decisions.
In his report before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972,
General Westmoreland statedi "Of the three major objectives in improv-
ing the way the Army does things (enhanced professionalism, improved
Service life, and a modernized accession system^ the first is
"^




V.ost or^nizationa, according to Bennis, regard econonic return as
the main stimulus for peak perforrrance. Such conpenaation is important
to the professional but, if economic awards are equitable, then other in-
centives become more important. Professionals tend to then seek other
rewards such as full use of their talent and training; professional sta-
tus; and opportunities for personal fjrowth, developnient, and training.
The most important incentive is to "make it" professionally and to be re-
spected by professional peers and other elements of society. This notion
is au^ented by Katz and Kahn who believe that the internalization of or-
ganizational goals is the most effective of motive patterns and the most
difficult to evoke within the limits of conventional organizational prac-
tice and policy. The degree of success depends upon the character of the
organizational goals and their congruence with the needs er\d values of
17
the individual, Herbert Simon and his co-authors suggest that each
member will continue participating only so loiig as the inducements
^.S, Airoy, "The Posture of the Army," Speech by General ffilliaa
V/estraoreland quoted in Army Speech File Service , VI (February, 1972), p. 12,
Warren G. Bennis, ed., A^ierican Bureaucracy (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1970 j, p, 170.
17
Katz and Kahn, p. 589« In another writing, Katz used the term
"internalization" to refer to the extent to which the organizational mem-
bers identify with the system in which they work, Daniel Katz, "The
Motivational Basis of Organizational Behavior, " Behavioral Science, IX
(April, 1964), 131-146. The term "socialization" on the other hand,
is the process whereby members are conditioned to take on the values and
behavior patterns prescribed for them by the organization, Barrett has
proposed that the degree of goal integration for any system can be con-
ceptualized as two intersecting sets of elements. One set consists of
individual goals and the other of organizational objectives. The greater
the proportion of the two sets which intersect each other, the greater is
the degree of goal integration. J. H. Barrett, Individual Goals and Or-
ganizational Objectives (Ann Arbor, Jiichigan: Iristitute for Social
Research, 1970J, p. 5.
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offered him are as great or greater (measured in terms of hi? valufe";
and in terms of t?ie alternatives ojjen to him) than the contritutiong
he is asked to ma.ke.
Although the Amed Service-.?, in theorj' have traditionally been
concerned rith an efficient use of their personnel, socialisation has
in fact been a .-najor goal. At the enlisted level, basic training i«
ained as much at instilling cert^.in attitude?, responses and loyal ti^.s
in a new rf-cnut as it is at teaching him specific skills. The intrr-L,
at every Ifvel, is to produce individuals who are useful to and work
vrell within the military, and this necessarily implies a certain
am.oimt of indoctrination. 'Chere is ample evidence that the nilitar^'
services have not been entirely successful in these efforts. As an
example, Kurt Lang believes that making militarj' life compatible vim
the demands of the specific job within the military and prorroting a
"nodus Vivendi" between the demands of a. military career and those of
family life continue to pose problems. Both the magnitude of the
adjustment problem p.nd the satisfactions found in the military situa-
tion reflect one's prior orientation to militaiy service and the
19
conditions under whicli that service is performed.
1 B
Herbert A. Simon, Donald V. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson,
Riblic Admini stration (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. }6?, The
military services, according- to Foi-tune in 1571» turned over 6C per
cent of their total personnel every ?. years. Few businers executives
ever witness that kind of turnover. Juan Cameron, "Ovir Gravest
Filitary Problem is Tanpov/er, " Fortune, April, 1971» F« 6l.
19
Kurt Lang, "Military Organizations," ^^andbook of Organira -




Several measures that have been employed in the Army to en-
hance professionalism and socialization have already been allu?ied to.
Professionalism, advertising, "imag-e-buildin^, " reduced family sep-
aration, greater training opportunities, reenlistm.ent and travel
options, removal of service irritants such as Kr and base support
functions, "ombudsman" roles—either implied or specifically designated,
and increased stability in career and rotation patterns are typical
examples. The Secretary of Defense implemented a "Human Coals" pro-
gram in early 1972 which prescribes specific objectives (including many
of the examples listed above) that give recognition to the dignity
20
and worth of each individual.
The impact of socializing elements aimed at retention in the
kTBTf is exceedingly difficult to assess at this time primarily because
these strategies have been imdertaken under stipulated conditions of
declining strength levels. It will be recalled that Figure 2 illus-
ti^ted a precipitous drop of the military force from 5 '55 million in
1968 to 2,2 million in 1973 • Socializing effects can only be inter-
preted under stable force level conditions which have just recently
21begun. Moreover as Chester Barnard implied nearly 40 years ago,
20
Kelvin R. Laird, "The All-Yolunteer Force, " an address before
the Association of the U.S. Army at Fort Kucker, Alabama, March 2?,
1972, p. 5.
21
un the basis of somewhat favorable reenlistment experience in
the first two months and tlie increasing first-tei-m rate throughout Fis-
cal 1973f the Army reenlistment objective for Fiscal 1974 appears
attainable. The July-August 1975 total of career enlistments in the
Army exceeded the goal by 400» "All-Volunteer Force Information,"




socializing influences are not panaceas. He stated:
The centrifuf^al forces of individualisn and conpetition
between organisations for individual contribution.'^ result
in rendering incentives and persuasion as bein^ ineffec-
tive, with few exceptions, for more than short periods or
a few years. The scheme of incentives is probalily the
most unstable of the elements in a cooperative system,
since invariably external conditions affect the possibili-
ties of material incentives; and human motives are like-
wise highly variable.
Kindful of the inability to achieve the desired strength level
in the Army of approximately 800,000 active duty Servicemen—despite
the concentration on two strategic sets (intensified recruitment and
retention^ related to boundary transactions—it follows that another
alternative strategy leads to the reexanination of the conversion pro-
cess.
Intemnal Reassessment
The Gates Commission suggested that the iJervices may find it
desirable to economize on manpower without sacrificing the overall
organizational goal of a stable defense posture, -^ Implicit in this
belief is a recognition that one further adaptive possibility is a
reassessment of the conversion process as reflected in the following:
SCliJJARIO E t AS PRIOR 3TRATEGIKS FALL SHORT OF MA>yO>V>:R FROCURl-2'.LyT
GOALS, THh ARiVT V.TLL Rn^SORV TO '^'ds^ 1:^^ A'. INATI OK OF 'xIjl.
COKVEHSION PROCESS IK Ti:.:&:S OF K;ANKINv"r J ':U0?JTIlS .
ALTERKATIVE l'X)HCx-. STRUCTURES. AND IKL'OyATIVK TECHKIQULS.
2?
Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge!
Harvard University Press, 1938)f PP» 142-158, passim .
The Report of the President's Commission; p. 30«
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Without elaborating on the specifics of priority manning within the
converTion process because of security cl''.5;sification, it is evident
that some personnel !T;anning priorities are in existence today. Such
priorities are prencribed by the determination of which Army units
are judged more important than others in tenr..- of national securit;/.
Those of highest criticality are receiving the greatest attention
and some specific examples have been implied in earlier chapters.
For example, the special bonuses assigned to combat am:^ and medic?!
units arc already programmed for personriel deeiried highly essential to
the conversion procer-'r. . Army divisions cor.posed of a nucleus of
active dutj*- forces augniented by inactive reserve strength are illus-
trative of alternative manning concepts that may achieve an acceptable
standard r^f readiness v/ith fev-er standing forces. 7ht cvorlappir^, and
even duplicative logistic support outlets of the individual military
services offer possibilities through merger v.'hich may thereby release
some personnel for combat force roles.
In Chapter Ii, the Army's conversion process v.-as described as
a complex ax-ray of man-machine systems, some of which are labor-
intensive and others capital-intensive. The Army may find it advan-
tageous to mechanize tasks nov performed manually, and to emphasize
(even more than at present) durabilitj'-, reliability', and ease of main-
tenance in the design of eouipnent and vehicles, and in the construc-
tion of facilities. As a practical matter, however, these steps will
likely require a long period of transition before the process of effect-
ing such subs tituti oils is perceptible. Recent experience with conventional
warfare in Vietnam suggests that the role of the combat infantryman will
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continue as before despite technological advancement in capital-
intensive weapon systems, and thin in generally regarded as difficiilt
and time-consuming to modify. Support, or logiatic, forces however,
are now receiving inter^ive scrutiny for pocsible displaoesent by
capital-intensive substitutes—particularly in materials handling
systems, naintenance techniques, computers, e.nd comm\mi cations equip-
ment. Since there are increasinf^ pressures for effecting this tj'p*;
of substitution, it is logical to assume the Army will devote con-
siderable attention to the possibilities of such conversions. Support
forces are also susceptible to the possibilities of'^eing "contracted
out" to civilian enterprise. Base maintenance and food sexrvice func-
tions are typical examples reflecting the replacement of soldiers ty
civilian workers.
Scenario E is both an on-poing and long-range strategy which
cannot be assessed at this time although it offers attr^.ctive potential.
Certainly, technological advances in this area are difficult to predict,
but» should Scenarios C and D not achieve desired manpoTrer strength
levels in the conversion process, the internal reassessment or rearrange-
ment becomes increasingly important.
As has been stressed, the dynamics of managing the change
process for adaptation to an all -volunteer Army is still evolving.
Three strategic concepts have been described in this chapter as measures
undertaken by one large complex organization. Such measures for tiiis
organization have been costly and increasingly subjected to public
criticism. Felix Moos points out that the 1974 budget outlays pro-
jected for the all-volunteer force are nearly four times the original

9c
(rr. fj-iate for a force of cor.parable rize. ^Tiile n-npo^rer corts for the
'•S iaillioji nen anri women in the Armed Forces ariounted to ?52.c bil-
lion in 19f^3, the present r^trength levol of 2.? rillion ia expected
to cost S4;'.9 "billion :n 1974. An all-voluriteer force, with 1.3
million fc'ver nen and v;o:,;f.n, 37 P^r cf^iit smaller than a contined
voUinteer an5 draft force, v.ill cort over 30 per cent more. Thus,
taking- infl? cionr-^ry fnctor? into account, the T'rdted States will be
spending a'bout % billion more in fi-^cal 1974 ^or only two-thirds of
Ih^ ntunber of ;r,ilitary nen and worien than had been the care in I968.
This incrra--e represent:? an overrun of approximately 3OC per cent,
according in lOO.", above the estinated 1971 costs predicted by the
G^ tnr^ Conr,; j r ••' -Ion.
It ±r --till prem-i.ture to judgo both the ii';pact ant? outcome oi"
tlio v.-',riou3 .strategies concurrently in process that have been presented
in thi.s stuay I'&cause coiicrcte evidence of success or failure will not
1 e realized for .several months to cor;e. Most observers agree today
that the Aiture of the all-voluntror Arp-.y is highly uncertain. Quite
obviously, there is no precedent; no nation has ever attempted to
m".ir.tain a vclvinteer force of such nagnitude. Additionally, it is
extremely difficTilt to attempt anj-- projections based on the current
jrtriofl of sliurply changing technological, economic, social, and political
patterns—all. cf vhich hnvc import?.nt implications for the structure
an-J content of inilitarj'- forces. Such effects are only peripheral to
O A
Felix I'oos, "ilir. tors'- and Culture: Sone Thoughts on the




the focus of this research, however. The •primzri'- consideration is
v/hother or not these ac'aptive phenomena are correlative 7-ith a far.ily
of theoretical conjectures that attempt to illuninate the rianner in
v.'hich a large orfanization v.ill likely adapt to change. Do such
actions by the Army, in terms of "orc^nizaticrt2.1 naneuverirg, " con-
stitute valid reflections of Thomp:;on's propocitions of a^laptation by





The identification and ioolation of a linkage between theory' and
practice have been matters of principal concern in thi? study. The
anticipnti,-^ advantages in applying the theoretical framGwork of
Thompson hj^ve been: (ij He incorporates the views of rany scholar^ on
organization thought vith substance that transcends a single dir.cij-linfe;
{?) He uniquely strives for a conbination of an open-:?y3tfeia frai::e'.vork
vith the classic character of closed-system models in a more cor'prehen-
sive expl^^nation of the behavior of orgariizn tions; and (3) He seeks an
"umbrella" of conJe.cUirea applicable to all types of in^trumtntal collec-
tivities:. During the course of this investigation, it has becone appar-
ent that rnicli an approach has serious deficiencies, hovever, snc these
will be elaborated in the final section.
The choice of the United States Ars'-iy as a practical focus for
the- application of Thompson's propositions has been enhanced by the
introduction of an exogenous change agent which has forced perceptible
strategies in adaptation that can be anal^r-^'ed. However, the organiza-
tional response to a single change variable (manpower procurement)
necessa.riTy narrows one's ability to transfer lessons learned in this
instance to other types of organizations.
The scheme of this research has been to develop conjecture and







A CORRLLATIVE LINKAGE BETATiEN THEORY AND REALITY
Propositions ( Connective Interpff^tations) Scenarios
2«1 Under norms of rational-
ity, organization seek to
seal off their core technolo-
gies from environTiental
influences.
A. The h.rrry was able to ensure the
dynamic continuity of its conversion
process hy resort to a compulsory
draft.
(ISOLATION BY FIAT)
2.4 Under norms of rational-
ity, organizations seek to
anticipate and adapt to en-
vironmental changes which can
not he buffered or leveled.
is. B;/- anticipating waning popular sup-
port for the draft, the Army adopted a
planning strategy for change that would
assure a continuous voluntary in^^ut to
its conversion process.
(C H A N G i:. PLANNING;
2.2 Under norms of rational-
ity, organizations seek to
buffer envirorcp.ental influ-
ences by surrounding their
technical cores with input
and output components.
C. 'ihe Army has reallocated ano irportea
resources, modified its structure and en-
gaged in a propagandistic canpaign for
attracting volunteei-g in order to sus-
tain its conversion process.
(INDUCEMENT M E C H A N I S K S)
2.5 Under norms of rational-
ity, organizations seek to
smooth out input and output
transactions.
L. The Army sought to buffer input trans-
actions through: (l) less stringent selec-
tion criteria that, in effect, enlarged
the eligible manpower pool, and (2) by
socializing factors aimed at retaining
more members in the conversion process.
(THROUGHPUT MODIFIERS)
2.5 ^ihen buffering, leveling
and forecasting do not protect
their technical cores from en-
vironmental fluctuations,
organizations under norms of
rationality resort to ration-
ing.
(CORE
L,» As prior strategies fall snort of
manpower procurement goals, the Armj'
will resort to the examination of its
conversion process in terms of manning
priorities, alternative force struc-





The first hypothesis in Chapter II suggested that Thompson's
propositions on organizational rationality are relevant to a l;=ir£:e
complex fovemmert organization which, in this study, is tested by
examination of the Army coping with uncertainty in a changing environ-
ment. Table 3 implies that relevance does exist and such an inter-
pretation can now be presented by means of a codified association.
The use of "2.1-A" for example, symbolizes initial attention to a
correlative match in which the compulsory draft ^Scer^rio a) ser\-es
as the "seal" strategy expressed b:-' Thompson, ThJ.s particular linkage,
2,1-A, is the moat identifiable and demonstrative correlation of the
five delineated in the matching table.
The next strong linkage, 2.4-B, appears so obvious and funda-
mental with respect to planning for change that it requires little
comment. The need for planning is widely acknowledged as a basic pre-
requisite for organizations, good business management, and policymaking
practices. The change-planning process of the Army described in Chap-
ter IV emphasiztn that planning, implementation, and execution in the
same focal field are often exercised concurrently and that it can
become difficult to isolate one from the other in terns of timir^ and
impact due to inherent complicative factors, A compression by six
Eror has written a book which dwells on thJ-s subject almost
exclusively. Since policjTnaking is directed at the future, it intro-
duces the persistent elements of uncertainty and doubtful prediction
that establish the primary character of nearly all policymaking
strategies. This is a striking parallel with the change-process
strategies of the Army that have been investigated. Yehezkel Lror,
Public Policymaking Reexamined (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler
Publishing Company, I968), p, I5.
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months in the transition process fron draft to voluntef-rirTi, osten-
sibly stimulated by the pressures of Congressional and Afniristraticn
declaration.^, accelerated the planrdng- phiase. Flans, f.-^perimentation,
feedbaclc, Service-wide adoption of innovative programs, together with
a large across-the-board pay hike early in the planning process illus-
trate the concurrency of i;lans and execution .-directed pt the sa4-ne
objective.
Linkage ?.,2-Q i.s more subtle than the first two. '•iith respect
to iiit)ut and output coinponents as buffers, Thonp.'^on fo^uscn primarily
on "physical" components such as inventories and distribution systems
although, coincidentally, the notion of "recraitment" i-^i rientioned.
Scenario C introduces physical conj.onents (recruitir^ and planning.,
organizations) as well, but also the n-.ore abstract philobophical co;.-
ponent of pix)paganda. The distribution of ronetaiy resources is a.1^o
prominent in both Scenarios B and C.
The terminologi-- in splice P.3-D is much broader than the pre-
vious lihi-:ai;,et5 ; hence it f-llov/s the introduction of a variety of st.r-"-
tegies within its rubric. The reader will note that considerable
license has betn exercised in Scenario D with Thompson's version of
"output transactions." He means, of course, thr. orgaiu::atiorial ou'put
and its interaction with the environment such as the product of a core
technology, 'llie scenarist, on the other hand, ignores this phenomenon
by substituting factors related to the egress cf manpower as an output
consideration. The analogy of 2.?-"0, therefore, is not especially
convincing nor is the focal proposition verjr explicit.
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Rationing, priorities, an'^ alternative r^trategic-s are nergcf
in 2.5-?*^. Scenario K in far broader in content than mere resort to
the strategy of rationing that Thor<ip3on aug^epts. The scer.ario is
admittedly a "catch-all" but, ir.or;t significantly, it suggests that
an organization may h?ive many more options, given the prereouiaites
that Thompson has prer.cribed, tb^n simply rationing as protection for
technical coves. Conceivably, the measures elaborated in Scenario '
could be bi-oadly interpreted as manifestations of a rationing process.
On balance, it appears that 'I'hompson's conjecture.-? are gener.^lly
a valid reflection of adaptive characteristics, undertaken by one large
government orgarazation; but Table 5 provides additior^al insights that
are unaccountef'' for in his theoretical framework.
ObservatLon.'^ Beyond The Thcoretic-'.l Frame-.vork
The second lij-po thesis of this research expressed a tendency for
the adaptive measures undertaken by the Amy to operate sequentially in
teims of timing and emphasi."^. >\jrther review of Table 3 seens to imply
that such a serial proce.ss has t=ken place in t'lis or^rani^ation. Jrr.e?
Thompson makes no such inference or expression of this possibility;
mcrcover, the reader v.ill note that the numerical order of the proposi-
tions as they sppear in the book, has been rearranged by the x'esearcher
in order to establisli connective characteristics that are more logically
sequential, "i-liis is by no means intended to imply that the Army has
dropped one scenario or strategy in favor of another. In fact, all
strategies except Scenario A are concurrently in operation today—and

lof.
appear to be maV:ing positive contributions to the all-volunteer Arr^'.
There is stronc evidence, hn.rever, that the direction of ir.creasir.^-
enph=*sis by the Army movej; from top to bottom in Table 3 s-s earlier
scenarios fall telov/ desired results. Such action entails n-.ore cor.-
prehensive and sophisticated strate^'.les with a higher degree of un-
certainty as to their effects. OnDy in Proposition 2.5 does 'j.'hompro-.
reflect a contingency that will becorre operative ir. the event f^at
hir; earlier propositions yield unsuccecrful resu3ts.
The analysis of af'aptive changes by the Army not only ru£ee^*-
a seouential phenomenon but also i>ose'-. a key que;-" ion: V.T.at ric'nt
occur if none of the sceriarios (or propositions) achieves the desirf ;"
rosultn? Thomprion would prob?ibly conclude that the tj'piical orf^.nir---
tion would either no longer survive ur. ler suc>i circunistani:;;:^ o •:
contintie operating but under a different set of goals.
There is no attempt in this writing to ju'-l^e the outcono of :.
evolutionary means to achieve the sll-volunteer Ar.-y. However, an ca-
tion does presumably exist for the AxT-y to revert to Scenario A in
which its conversion process may again be sealed off from e ^ivi ronr f n + - :.
influences. The Selective Service System is still in partial operation.
The nation's youth must still register, and local boards as -A-ell as the
According to Stephen }Ierbits ( op . cit ., p. 64) a federal
statute (Public Lav; 97-1^9) in 1971 authorized a continuance of the
Selective Service Sj'^stem on an austere basis but the langu-ge of the
law was changed in that the President must first obtain Corigre?r.ion.^l
approval before the draft can be resumed. Congre5„-s has stipulated
that the Administration must call up Heserves sn^' ITational Guard before
it turns to a reinstatement of the draft to meet further contingencies.
With the Sj^steri still in operation, a rapid transition to consoriptioii
could be accomplished in an emergency.
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national headquarters are still functioning under a budtret of approx-
imately S45 million for Fiscal 1975 • 3y continuing X'r.f System in i *:5
present state, the possibilities for regression to Scer^rio A cam'- -,
be discounted. The capacity for a regressive transition, a phencrisnon
not envisioned by Thompson in his writing, is ctviously urdque »ith
respect to conscription in the context of a st.nndby cjeiective ijervice
System. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the reputed dysfunctirj-^l
characteristic of "rigidity" (resistance to ch?.ri£-e^ it. •: thrr bar<.^.i-
cracies might operate in similar fashion when adaptive rr saaures are
unsuccessful and discarded. The ur/je by bureaucrats to return to t'r-tir
former "modus operandi" is an inclination noted frequently by astute
observers. The third hypothesis of this research 8ugt;fer;*a that sn -h
a contir^ency may occur in the Ars;/ as described in th'- ic-llcwir.
setting*
SClJiARIO F ; IF THE AF.>.'.Y FAILS IK FULFILLIKG -- •--^— • r-u. j>r - _\ry^
DESCRIBE];) IK THti SCj.KA.''JOSj_ IT^^ ".
STlLVrEGY THAT STHIVr.S } OH Rt-VLH, ; ...: TO A . . . _. ->1 CI.'
STAKCL IN \.HigH TllK 0:GA>r[ZATION ..ILL A" ' ' ". 0>. . . .
CONVLHSIOi; FHQCbSS Fr.C:.. hlfyiHOK'hNTAL i:-
___.
Rigidity in bureaucracies (as it might possibly precipitate in
the Army) has been the subject of continuing scrutiny r';^in? the oc -r-~e
of this research. The writings of Crozier, Blau, Dowii-j, Victor ThotVvw=on,
Herbert Kaufman, Michels, and Gouldner are clear in their Tramin^ cf
this dysfunctional attribute in the bureaucratic typolc^^' of organiza-
tions. Vifhile their arguments are often valid and convincing, it hsp been
exceedingly difficult to elicit and identify thi3 characteristic in the
Army's adaptive process for significant reasons. As was stated earlier
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in this v/riting, Anthony Downs concluded that an exoy^enaus chin^e ia
more likely to stinul^.to an ?.ciaptive response in a ture^ucracy Vec = use
such changre'j are vi-ible to external agents and are th&rsl'ore ^..-sro
likely to generate pressure fror. them. The- President and Secret-»ry
of Defense have declared that there 7dll hi an all-volv.Ti'-.r-t';- .
The inajorit:/ of Con^rosg has endorsed this ('eclaralion ani .t,?...v l.cr.bcr3
are closely monitoring; the iiripac t of organi?,ational adaptation 15 the
all-voluntifcr goal. Oren resirtence to the f.ll -volunteer cor
Amy representatives could be regarded ay "sciJitious" in natu--
not likely to be a nanifestation of this particular c^aMfe j
Klenents of the nev.s nerUa have .alleged, hr-ever, t''-
'
has covertly resiste^ the manc^r.te by more subtle me-.. . j^-
s iona 1
.
--'uf yte r1 y has surriiarized these aescrtioiw fror? a varj.
•
sources hy suggesting:
{1) 'Die increasingly high costs that are reflected i •^e
Departinent proposals for the maintenp.nce o*" an all-volunteer
well beyonc' earlier estimates, "ill dissuac'e the political It.: .._r.
from continuing to endorse the all -volunteer concept Iv .-.-use it .- too
expensive.
(?) The transfer of the Ariny recruiting headquarters t" '.^..icrgo
la.st JunR has left the Army vath limited connuinication- facili' ! .- -vith
its field recruiters.
(3) The Arpiy h?>d a deliberate short.-^ge of approximately '^C.C
recruiters in the field last su;:;j':cr at a tir.r- v.-hen these recrvJ- .
if in place, might have delivered '^OOO additional reci'uits in Ju..-- .
'Downs, op. cit .. p. 17.
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The Aimy denies these assertions of deliberate attempts to inhibit the
all-volunteer force. During the course of this investigation, any
evidence of resistance supporting- the above allegations was not appar-
ent. The Conyarresaionql (juarterly adds that civilian and military-
leaders deny the existence of any contingency plan for a new draft.
The points have been presented here merely for conjecture.
It was ass-uBied at the outset that the stimulus for change to
the all-volunteer force was a preponderance of public opinion favoring
the end of the draft. The findings based en opinion polls presented in
Chapter III imply the contrary, hux the inference may have been spurious.
The ou-bcome in attempting to dr^w conclusions from seemingly relevant
opinion data on a very narrow issue introduced in this case study has
been elusive and frustrating. There is, in fact, no discernible con-
crete and specific data available on public endorsement of the volunteer
force although respondents continue to favor some tj'pe of required
national service for the nation's youth, but not necessarily military
5
service. The primary stimulus for change in the case study rer.ains a
^"Volunteer Army: Will Draft Be Called Off Bench?" Conrres-
sional Ciniarterly. XXXI (September 22, 1973 )i PP. 252 5-2 526. On July 18,
1973» the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Kr. Clerasnts met with members of
the Pentagon Press Corps and responded -to the following questions*
"At v?hat point would you go back to the draft on a shortfall?"
(Ans.i "We're not.
"J
"I know, but if the shortfall stopped up manning, at what point would
you "
(Ans.s "I'm sorry; it's not even \inder consideration.")
As recent as November 22, 1973t over 60 per cent of a national
sampling by Gallup favored compulsory service in governiaent for young
Americans. George Gallup, "National Service For Youths Favored,"
Detroit Free Pressy November 22, 1973» p. 8-A.
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mystery and oTfers interesting possibilities for further research. The
purpose in dwelling on this point haa 'been to e.-nphasize that the re-
searcher must be warii*- of basing any conclusioris on general opinion
polls because the inferences drawn from what appear to be pertinent
Questioris and respon.';es raay be misleading.
It must be stressed that the selection of a large complex or-
ganization for case ana.lysis represents a sir.gle vantage point from Trhich
to analyze one isolated response to a single independent variable. It is
evident that this saniG theoretical framework of accounting for adapta-
tion to change would have to be applied to other types of organizatior^
—
and under vaiying circunstances—before such propositions are germane in
broad perspective. But even then, such analogies wo\xld not be persuasive
because of the inherent operational shortcomings described in the next
section.
A Critical Overview
This study supports Thompson's concluding comment in which he
states:
. . . v?ithout refinement of the rather crude concepts we have been
,J using, ve are not going to get very far in testing hyj^otheses or
/ ^ in askii).^ ipore sophisticated questions. . . '..e must have operations
whj.ch vlll enable us to say that in fact the specified conditions
do cr CO not exist.
The need for further refinement has been a matter of serious concern in
this analyci.'-. In retrospect, the case presented here is merely an
extension of xhompson's analogies that precludes the operational rigor
he implore?. Unfortunately, he offers no guidance on the nature of
n^ James D. Thoinpson, Organizations in Action, p. I63.
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operations that he may have had in mind. Scientific investigators" srust
ultimately face the necessity of measuring the variables of the relations
they are studying-. Scientific observations are impossible without clear
and specific instructions on what and how to observe, nliat, for instance,
constitutes the identity of an operation such as, ". . .organizations
seek to anticipate and adapt to environmental changes . . ."in Proposi-
tion 2.4 that the researcher can measure in terms of similiarities and
differences among organizations? Une possibility is that 'iliOEpson could
have assigned operational meaning to this planninc' function in terms of
identifying the number of personnel and amount of resources coxaitted
to planning, Anderson and Warkov's study, for example, attenpted to
correlate the degree of emphasis on administrative functions with organi-
zational size by measuring, in a varietj- of organizations, the propor-
7tion of members engaged in administrative irork. Ly resort to analogies
alone in explanatory discourse, Thompson begs the question of how to
operationalize his concepts and thereby falls short of providing us with
theoretical building blocks from which to compare the salient attributes
of complex organizations.
While a loose connection has now been suggested between theory
and reality for one specific organization, a related conclusion is one
of general objection to the application of theoretical xmiversals in
such a broad framework. It does not appear likely tliat a consensus will
ever be achieved on a single theory of beloavior in instrumental organiza-
tions that Thompson has implied. He writes;
7
'Anderson and Warkov, pp. 23-28.

112
A central purpose of this book is to identify a freiCfe«ork which
might lin}': at important point3 several of the nev.' ir.d?-pendent
approaches to the understaJiding of complex organi^'_tiorlS. . . It
is probahly inevitable that the early history of 2 .rcientific
endeavor will be cyiaracterized ... by the search lor urdversalj.
This certainly has been the case v.ith or(ranization?.i theory . . .
To the latter point, Professor Robert ?. Boynton of The rjr:erican
University has aptly replied: "There is no euch thin^ a? an organization
theory; rather, there is a field of organization thougat consistir.,^ of a
voltmiinous number of theories."
It has become increasingly clear from Thcr.pson' . .^-n choice, of
words that the quest for universals in describin,^ the behavior of cct-
plex organizations is an exercise in futility. A clore ty.air.ir^tion of
the propositions cited in this investigation serve as r.-^Sri to obscure
their pertinence to reality as to illurriinate. The usage of buffer,
leveling, smoothing, core technolog}'; output, ?~A ncrn^.,- -^f r:::tier,'>ji^"
are examples of abstractions that have contributed to scr.e of the tcii.;oas
relationships with scenarios experienced in this writir; . ^uch ter^r. sre
so sweeping and vague that they lose their utility.' in - • -: ting to
achieve an "unibrella" which seeks to capture the specific and often unique
attributes of various instrumental organizations. Is it rot still another
means of explaining away the behavior of organizations; ir. terms of a r.c-w
and isolable "closed-system" framework?
It is recognized that the classification or taxcn,\-;y of or/aniza-
tions is a useful endeavor and should be continued—but thare are upper
limits in the extent that such categories can embrace a f^r;ily of col-
lectivities exhibiting congruous attributes.
8J^ames L. Thompson, Organizations in Action, pp. vii and viii.

APPENDIX
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Includes funds for civilianization of KP, ?nd certain other non-rission
tasks, improvements to commissaries and othrr post facilities, recrea-
tional equipment, on-post transportation strvices, and expanded medical
services.
Source: Fact sheet dated January' 1974 (a "qv.asi -official" document)
as backup material for: "Report to the Sci?. to Armed Ser^'ices
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